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TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT DISCOVERY
Aaron D. Simowitz*
Joseph Stiglitz described the current Argentine sovereign debt crisis as
“America throwing a bomb into the global economic system.”1 And yet, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided to tackle only one head of this massive hydra.
Presented with numerous issues arising from the controversy, the Court
granted certiorari only on the issue of whether the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) blocked Argentina’s creditors from obtaining
discovery of Argentina’s worldwide financial transactions. Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, concluded that because the FSIA says nothing on its
face about discovery—it says nothing about discovery.
But the majority did not grapple with the worldwide nature of the
discovery granted. It assumed, without deciding, that worldwide discovery
in aid of enforcement of a judgment is usually appropriate. This prompted
Justice Ginsburg to dissent. Justice Ginsburg wrote that U.S. courts should
not assume that the “sky may be the limit” for post-judgment discovery,
especially given that other countries typically have far more limited
document production.
For Justice Ginsburg, discovery in aid of
enforcement of a judgment is presumptively about U.S. courts looking to
U.S. law about assets in the United States.
The split in the Court reflects deep confusion and disagreement among
U.S. courts on the role of discovery in an era of worldwide hunts for assets
to satisfy unpaid judgments and arbitral awards. Courts have struggled to
define the limits of worldwide enforcement discovery for one overriding
reason: U.S. courts—following the Supreme Court’s lead—have applied
tests and concepts developed for pretrial discovery to the very different
world of post-judgment enforcement discovery. Post-judgment enforcement
discovery differs in its purposes, its presumptions, and its problems. This
Article grapples with each and proposes new approaches to tackling two
obstacles to enforcement discovery—restrictions on discovery and on
execution.
* Fellow, New York University School of Law; Lecturer in Law, Columbia Law School. I
owe great thanks to Linda Silberman, Franco Ferrari, Richard Epstein, Pamela Bookman,
and the participants in the New York University Lawyering Colloquium for their insightful
comments, suggestions, and critiques. I also owe special thanks to Teresa Teng and Neto
D.C.B. Waite for their exceptional research assistance. I am also indebted to my wife for her
input, patience, and support.
1. Peter Eavis & Alexandra Stevenson, Argentina Finds Relentless Foe in Paul
Singer’s Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 30, 2014, 10:35 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/in-hedge-fund-argentina-finds-relentless-foe/.
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INTRODUCTION
Judgments matter. When a court renders a money judgment, it states that
a defendant has breached its obligations under a sovereign’s public or
private law. The court empowers the plaintiff—now the creditor—to
demand payment from the defendant—now the debtor. The creditor is
likewise empowered to seize the debtor’s assets and to sell them to the
highest bidder. The creditor can take this judgment to the courts of other
sovereigns and expect that they too will grant it these extensive powers over
the debtor.
And yet courts and scholars have underestimated or ignored the
differences between the pretrial and post-judgment worlds. In Republic of
Argentina v. NML Capital,2 both the majority opinion and Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent exhibit a failure to appreciate the significant difference
between pretrial merits discovery and discovery in aid of enforcement. This
is not exceptional but rather symptomatic of U.S. courts’ tendency to treat
enforcement discovery like garden-variety merits discovery. This failure
has led to widespread confusion and disagreement—on display in the
clashing NML opinions—particularly when parties seeking transnational
2. 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
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enforcement discovery are faced with obstacles interposed by foreign
sovereigns.
This Article is the first to assess the fundamental differences between
merits and enforcement discovery—different purposes, different standards
of relevance, and different due process interests, to name just a few
examples. To this point, U.S. courts have struggled to formulate clear
standards for transnational enforcement discovery due to the unwarranted
reliance on concepts developed for pretrial merits discovery. New
standards proposed here will permit new answers to a classic conflict in
transnational discovery—conflicts with foreign statutes restricting
discovery—and to the emerging conflict highlighted by the dueling NML
opinions—conflicts with statutes restricting seizures of assets.
In NML, a group of U.S.-based hedge funds obtained judgments against
Argentina totaling approximately $1.7 billion.3 U.S. federal courts became
the battleground for the dispute, taking up numerous questions, including
the interpretation of the sovereign debt instruments that gave rise to the
judgments, the ability of a U.S. court to enjoin the actions of a foreign
sovereign, and the power of a U.S. court to order discovery into sovereign
assets throughout the world.4 Argentina submitted certiorari petitions on
each of these issues. The U.S. Supreme Court granted only the petition on
the question of discovery.5
The Court decided the case narrowly, holding that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act6 (FSIA) said nothing on its face about discovery—and
therefore had nothing to say about discovery.7 But the NML opinions
highlighted a deeper conflict on the role of extraterritorial asset discovery.
The seven-Justice majority assumed, without deciding, that extraterritorial
asset discovery was essentially always appropriate. Justice Ginsburg
dissented. She noted that post-judgment asset discovery must be “relevant”
to the enforcement of the judgment.8 If an asset cannot be seized, sold, and
applied to the judgment, discovery of that asset cannot be “relevant” to
satisfaction of the judgment. From this premise, she reached two
conclusions: first, that U.S. courts should presumptively look to U.S. law to
govern what assets are subject to seizure, even if the assets are located
abroad, and second, that whatever a foreign court may do in enforcing a
U.S. judgment is not “relevant” to the U.S. judgment.9 In other words, a
U.S. judgment is about what happens in the United States, to assets in the
United States, under U.S. law.

3. Sophia Pearson, Singer Seeks Order to Keep Argentine Lawyer in U.S., BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 5, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-05/singerseeks-order-to-keep-argentine-lawyer-in-u-s-.
4. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012).
5. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2254.
6. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified in 28 U.S.C §§ 1330, 1602–
1611).
7. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2256–58.
8. Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9. See id.; infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
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This is a local, territorial view of enforcement discovery. The great
weight of authority from the lower U.S. courts paints a different picture.10
Most lower courts see themselves as actively engaged in helping their
judgment creditors seek out assets around the world—appointing
themselves, as one NML district court did, as “clearinghouse[s]” for
information on all the debtor’s assets.11 This approach looks both home
and abroad for any avenues that could lead to satisfaction of the judgment.
Accordingly, these courts see few limitations, if any, on extraterritorial
asset discovery. This is a transnational view of enforcement—that
judgment enforcement is, by nature, likely to be transnational.
No court or scholar has directly addressed this tension to resolve when
and whether a court should order worldwide enforcement discovery.
Indeed, these questions are unanswerable without a better understanding of
how extraterritorial asset discovery serves the aims of the judgment
enforcement system—a subject also unexplored by courts or scholars.
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman identified the bedrock purposes
of the judgment enforcement system in their seminal work on recognition of
foreign judgments, among them a “concern to protect the successful
litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, from harassing or evasive tactics on
the part of his previously unsuccessful opponent” and “a policy against
making the availability of local enforcement the decisive element, as a
practical matter, in the plaintiff’s choice of forum.”12
A robust presumption in favor of extraterritorial asset discovery certainly
contributes to the certainty and expedition of satisfying judgments. But the
importance of court-ordered discovery in this process was heavily debated
in the NML litigation (and also unremarked on by the Supreme Court). On
this subject, the irreconcilable adversaries turned suddenly humble, with
Argentina arguing that the funds had done a masterful job locating assets
without court-ordered discovery and the funds countering that they never
could have found any assets without the courts’ timely assistance.13 In the
modern era of judgment enforcement, where the assets at issue are far more
likely to be intangible—such as brokerage accounts, LLC interests, and
electronic funds transfers—enforcement discovery has redoubled
importance.14
Von Mehren and Trautman’s less obvious purpose for judgment
enforcement—that the forum of adjudication should not be yoked to the
10. See infra notes 82–101 and accompanying text.
11. See NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2254.
12. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1603–04
(1968).
13. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6–8, NML, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842),
2013 WL 122883; Brief in Opposition at 7, NML, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), 2013 WL
8479866; see also id. at 21–22 (“[I]f creditors cannot obtain the information needed to locate
even non-immune assets to satisfy a judgment in their favor—despite having won the case
on the merits—then enforcement against a recalcitrant sovereign such as Argentina becomes
nearly impossible.”).
14. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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location of the debtor’s assets—has profound implications for transnational
enforcement discovery. It counsels that courts rendering a judgment should
take an active role in locating assets in other jurisdictions, guiding judgment
creditors to where they can pursue satisfaction of their judgment. The
importance of the judgment rendering court as guide is magnified where
other jurisdictions will refuse to enforce a judgment without a jurisdictional
nexus (for example, a showing that the debtor has property in the
jurisdiction) or will charge the creditor sometimes steep fees to recognize
the foreign judgment.15
Argentina and its central bank, itself a target of extraterritorial asset
discovery, also strongly objected to the New York federal court appointing
itself the “clearinghouse” for all information on Argentina’s assets, in
whatever country, in whomever’s hands.16 The New York court did not
examine its authority to take this step—but it would have found itself the
latest in a long, but not unbroken, line of courts to do so. The great weight
of authority is that, where asset discovery is concerned, United States courts
treat enforcement as transnational, enthusiastically searching for assets
around the world. In the context of arbitration awards, scholars, arbitrators,
and courts have become quite comfortable with the notion that arbitrators
and courts at the seat of arbitration should take an active role in ensuring
enforceability of the award.17 Enforcement of arbitral awards is, unlike
judgments, the subject of a widely adopted treaty, the New York
Convention.18 But this does not necessarily mean that a judgment,
conversely, is territorially bounded in nature. Indeed, many U.S. states
have adopted comparatively generous judgment enforcement laws in the
express hope that their judgments will be liberally enforced abroad.19 The
question is therefore not: When should extraterritorial asset discovery be
granted? But: When should it be refused?
15. See, e.g., Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money
Judgments in Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 175, 198–200 (2005) (discussing costs and
requirements of enforcing foreign money judgments in Germany); see also Yves P. Piantino,
Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments Between the United States and
Switzerland: An Analysis of the Legal Requirements and Case Law, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 91, 133–36 (1997).
16. Corrected Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 16, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), 2011 WL 5967280 (“[T]he district court held a
second hearing on the pending motions at which it declared that it could serve as ‘a
clearinghouse for information . . . that might lead to attachments or executions anywhere in
the world.’ In expressing this view, the court disregarded the fact that the attachments NML
has sought ‘anywhere in the world’ have, in almost every case, as described above, been
denied by the courts of those foreign jurisdictions.” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
17. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 920 (2d ed. 2001); DAVID D. CARON ET AL., THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES: A COMMENTARY 53 (2006).
18. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention], implemented
by An Act to Implement the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208
(2012)).
19. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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This is the immediate question that drove Justice Ginsburg to dissent
from an otherwise unanimous opinion in NML. Justice Ginsburg stated that
a “court in the United States has no warrant to indulge the assumption that,
outside our country, the sky may be the limit for attaching a foreign
sovereign’s property in order to execute a U.S. judgment against the foreign
sovereign,” and that, “[u]nless and until” the judgment creditor can show
that foreign law would permit the execution on the debtor’s assets, “I would
be guided by the one law we know for sure—our own.”20
The Court’s diverging viewpoints highlighted that there is no established
conflict of laws framework for when extraterritorial asset discovery should
be granted or refused. Extraterritorial enforcement discovery typically can
encounter two obstacles: restrictions on discovery (immunity from
disclosure) and restrictions on execution (immunity from seizure and sale).
The Court has set down two prominent markers on the questions of when
American pretrial discovery should overcome foreign restrictions. In
Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v.
Rogers,21 the Court overturned sanctions for failure to comply with a
document production order because “petitioner’s failure to satisfy fully the
requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered neither
by its own conduct nor by circumstances within its control,” as it is “hardly
debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for
nonproduction.”22 However, in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale
v. United States District Court,23 the Court emphasized that a foreign law
prohibition does not necessarily excuse compliance with an American
production order.24 The Court stated that “[i]t is well settled that such
[foreign blocking] statutes do not deprive an American court of the power
to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though
the act of production may violate that statute.”25
Since Aerospatiale, courts and commentators have extensively explored
the reach and limits of transnational pretrial discovery. Neither courts nor
commentators have explored the reach and limits of post-judgment
discovery. Indeed, when courts have confronted the issue, they have
attempted to apply, without modification, the rules developed for pretrial
discovery. But post-judgment discovery is a far different creature, with its
own purposes, procedures, and problems. At a minimum, the test
announced in Aerospatiale must be substantially modified to account for
the facts that a debtor resisting production is presumably acting in bad faith
by refusing to pay or bond a judgment, that the remedies available for bad
faith behavior pretrial—such as contempt sanctions or an adverse
20. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
22. Id. at 211.
23. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
24. Id. at 544 n.29.
25. Id.; see also United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“Societe Internationale did not erect an absolute bar to summons enforcement and contempt
sanctions whenever compliance is prohibited by foreign law.”).
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inference—are either unavailable or ineffective, and that the due process
interests of a debtor are significantly reduced when a judgment or arbitral
award is rendered.
The split in the Court’s NML opinions shone a bright light on the
complete absence of authority on the second source of conflict with
American transnational discovery—restrictions on execution. There are
four potential rules for conflicts between extraterritorial discovery and
exemptions from execution.
The NML majority assumed that
extraterritorial asset discovery is typically permissible. Justice Ginsburg
argued that discovery should be blocked where U.S. law would bar
execution—essentially exporting U.S. law on immunity from execution to
other nations. A third approach is that U.S. courts could refuse asset
discovery when the foreign nation where the asset sits would bar execution.
Finally, U.S. courts could refuse discovery where essentially no country
would permit execution, attempting to divine a customary international law
norm barring, for example, seizure of consular property. This final rule best
serves the purposes of judgment enforcement and reflects the transnational
nature of judgments and post-judgment asset discovery.
Part I of this Article explores in depth the fundamental differences
between merits and enforcement discovery. Part II applies these insights to
developing conflict rules to govern when extraterritorial assets discovery
should be granted or refused when faced with foreign restrictions on
discovery. Part III tackles the same question with regard to foreign and
domestic restrictions of execution of assets.
I. A DIFFERENT DISCOVERY
In 1936, Robert P. Patterson, who would later turn down a seat on the
Supreme Court to become Secretary of War,26 considered five postjudgment subpoenas served on third-party stockbrokers in an attempt to
recover a judgment of nearly $300,000.27 Judge Patterson stated: “To be
sure, the subpoenas are a fishing excursion, but a judgment creditor is
entitled to fish for assets of the judgment debtor. Otherwise he will rarely
obtain satisfaction of his judgment from a reluctant judgment debtor.”28
This statement captures the essence of the difference between pretrial and
post-judgment discovery. American pretrial discovery is certainly broad.29
Commentators and scholars have often noted its breadth in comparison to

26. J. Garry Clifford, Introduction to ROBERT PORTER PATTERSON, THE WORLD WAR I
MEMOIRS OF ROBERT P. PATTERSON: A CAPTAIN IN THE GREAT WAR xiii, xiv–xv (J. Garry
Clifford ed., 2012).
27. Capital Co. v. Fox, 15 F. Supp. 677, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
28. Id. (Lathrop v. Clapp. 40 N.Y. 328 (1869)).
29. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947); see also Gordon W. Netzorg
& Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather Than the Exception,
87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 532 (2010).
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the more limited document production permitted in most civil law
countries.30 But pretrial discovery is still no “fishing excursion.”
Post-judgment or post-award discovery—“enforcement discovery”—by
necessity partakes of different values than pretrial discovery. When a
judgment or award is rendered, the ground shifts decisively between the
parties. In a merits proceeding, the purpose of pretrial discovery is to
obtain information to determine the truth or falsity of certain claims,
without permitting discovery when the burdens of production are out of
proportion to the likelihood of producing probative evidence. The court
must guard carefully against discovery requests calculated to impose
expense or to force settlement, rather than to produce useful information. It
is a delicate task.
Post-judgment, the court’s job is to turn the paper judgment into actual
relief—into cash.31 For noncompliant debtors, this is done by locating
assets, seizing them, selling them, and applying that amount to the
outstanding judgment. In the view of some courts, the court shifts from
impartial adjudicator to ally in the quest to vindicate both the creditor’s
interests and the court’s outstanding judgment.32
In NML, the Supreme Court waded hip-deep into these muddy waters.
The ongoing saga of the Argentine sovereign debt litigation constitutes one
of the most influential transnational disputes of the decade. In the throes of
one financial crisis, Argentina issued large amounts of sovereign debt. In
the throes of the next financial crisis, Argentina found itself unable to
satisfy these obligations. Argentina approached the purchasers of its
sovereign debt and asked them to accept so-called exchange bonds as a
trade-in for the original sovereign bonds—essentially, to accept a
substantial haircut off the value of the original bonds.33 A few U.S.-based
hedge funds, led by Paul Singer’s Elliott Management Corporation, had
purchased the Argentine debt at a discount on the secondary market. They
refused to take a haircut and made clear their intention to seek the full value
of the sovereign bonds.34
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Argentina had found it somewhat difficult to
issue debt at attractive rates. To give prospective lenders some comfort, the
bonds were governed by New York law, enforceable in New York courts,

30. See Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules—Modernization of
the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 431, 443 (2004); see also
Keith Y. Cohan, Note, The Need for a Refined Balancing Approach When American
Discovery Orders Demand the Violation of Foreign Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1009, 1044
(2009).
31. For a money judgment, at least. For other forms of relief, a judgment places the
court in a managerial role over the obligations of the defendant. See Samuel L. Bray, The
Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1127–28 (2014) (“[T]he
availability of contempt sanctions means that the court has committed itself to manage the
parties’ compliance with the decree and has put its own prestige on the line to back up this
commitment.”).
32. See infra notes 82–94 and accompanying text.
33. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2012).
34. See id. at 253.
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and contained broad waivers of sovereign immunity.35 The funds—labeled
“holdout funds” or “vulture funds,” depending on whom you ask36—sued in
the Southern District of New York. The court held that Argentina owed the
funds the full amount of the bonds.37 That was the easy part.
Argentina countered that, although it might owe the funds the full
amount of the original bonds, it was entitled to pay its other creditors—
specifically, the more compliant creditors that had accepted the exchange
bonds—ahead of the holdout funds.38 The funds responded that the “pari
passu” clause in the bonds prevented this by requiring that all holders of the
bonds be paid “at least equally.”39 The funds followed up with two
additional requests for the New York court: first, that it issue an injunction
barring Argentina from paying the exchange bond holders ahead of them
and barring various banks from processing any such payments, and second,
that it compel Argentina and various third parties to reveal the nature of
Argentina’s financial transactions around the world.40
The district court ruled against Argentina on the pari passu issue and
issued both the injunction and orders compelling worldwide discovery of
Argentina’s assets.41 The Second Circuit affirmed each decision.42 At oral
argument on the injunctive issue, Argentina’s counsel averred that his client
would not comply with the court’s order, regardless of how the Second
Circuit ruled.43 After its defeat before the appellate court, Argentina
disavowed this position in seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court.44 It

35. See id. at 253–54.
36. See, e.g., John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures: NML Capital v. Republic of
Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1671,
1685 (2014).
37. See NML, 699 F.3d at 254.
38. See id. at 252.
39. See id. at 258–59 (“[W]e conclude that in pairing the two sentences of its Pari Passu
Clause, the FAA manifested an intention to protect bondholders from more than just formal
subordination.”).
40. See, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 256 & n.4 (2d
Cir. 2012); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172,
175–76 (2d Cir. 2011); Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d
120, 124–27 (2d Cir. 2009); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 & n.2 (2d
Cir. 2007).
41. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 03 Civ. 2507 (TPG), 2011 WL
3897828, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011), aff’d sub nom. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,
134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (granting discovery); see also NML, 699 F.3d at 250–51 (affirming
district court orders holding that Argentina had violated the pari passu clause and issuing the
injunctions).
42. See supra note 41.
43. Response of Appellees to the Republic of Argentina’s March 29 Proposal at 3, NML,
699 F.3d 246, 2013 WL 1790907 (“At the most recent hearing before this Court, Argentina’s
counsel declared that Argentina would not ‘voluntarily obey’ any order ‘other than’ the one
it ‘proposed.’” (citation omitted)).
44. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 12–13, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990), 2014 WL 2201061 (“To be clear, absent relief
Argentina will comply with the orders under review.”); see also Alison Frankel, In New
SCOTUS Brief, Argentina Pledges to Comply with U.S. Courts, REUTERS (May 30, 2014),
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did no good. The Court denied certiorari on both the pari passu issue and
the injunctive issue.45
The only issue that the Court took up was whether worldwide discovery
of Argentina’s assets was appropriate. The issue was framed not, however,
as whether worldwide discovery was permissible, but rather as whether the
FSIA barred discovery of Argentina’s assets. The FSIA contains wellknown jurisdictional immunities for foreign sovereigns and foreign
sovereign instrumentalities.46 These were explicitly waived in the terms of
the Argentine bonds themselves.47 However, the FSIA also confers
immunities from execution for the assets of foreign sovereigns and foreign
sovereign instrumentalities. These provisions provide that the property of a
sovereign is only subject to execution if it is located in the United States
and if the property itself is used for commercial purposes (the commercial
use exception is somewhat broader for sovereign instrumentalities).48
Argentina raised several distinct but related arguments. First, it argued
that the FSIA’s exemptions from execution necessarily imply restrictions on
discovery. From this premise, Argentina argued two conclusions: first, that
the funds must present evidence that its assets would be subject to seizure
under the FSIA before receiving any discovery, and second, that the FSIA’s
immunity from execution shielded even non-sovereign third parties holding
Argentine assets (predominantly banks) from asset discovery.49
The funds’ response was three-fold. First, the funds argued that the FSIA
says nothing about discovery and, indeed, the legislative history
demonstrates that this was a conscious and considered omission. Second,
the funds contended that, even if the FSIA had something to say about
discovery, any such protections would not extend to third parties holding
sovereign assets. Third, the funds objected to the notion that creditors
would be able to present evidence that sovereign assets could be seized
under the FSIA without receiving any discovery. Such a rule, they argued,
would effectively immunize sovereign assets from execution as creditors
could discover only those assets that the sovereign chose to make available
(presumably, none). The overarching theme of their argument was that the
FSIA is a “comprehensive” scheme that should not be supplemented by
U.S. courts.
At argument, the Justices, Justice Ginsburg excepted, heaped scorn on
the notion that the FSIA, sub silentio, imposed restrictions on discovery.50
Justice Ginsburg appeared to be the only member of the Court sympathetic
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/05/30/in-new-scotus-brief-argentina-pledges-tocomply-with-u-s-courts/.
45. The Court denied certiorari in the injunction matter and on the pari passu issue on
the same day it announced its decision in the discovery case. See NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2013).
46. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
47. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2014).
48. See id.
49. See Brief for Petitioner at 28, NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), 2014 WL
768310.
50. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, NML, 134 S. Ct. 2250.
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to Argentina’s argument that the restrictions on execution necessarily
implied restrictions on discovery. All seemed well for the funds until Ted
Olson, counsel for the creditors, approached the podium. The Court,
seemingly as a whole, expressed grave concern that untrammeled discovery
could reach into areas of intense sovereign sensitivity—such as, for
example, jet fighters.51 Mr. Olson responded that the discovery requests at
issue concerned only financial transactions, but this seemed to make no
impression on the Court. Several members of the Court expressed the
belief that the United States would strongly object to such discovery of its
assets (indeed, the United States had already said as much in its amicus
briefs supporting Argentina at the certiorari and merits stage).52 Skepticism
seemed to come from all angles. In one colloquy, Justice Scalia queried
whether a New York judgment would carry with it exemptions from
execution imposed by New York law, hypothesizing a fictional New York
Homestead Act.53 (Justice Sotomayor responded, correctly, that it would
not.54)
The Court’s opinion seemed to bear no marks of this late-breaking
skepticism. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that the FSIA
says nothing about discovery—and therefore, says nothing about discovery.
He essentially adopted the funds’ argument regarding timing: if the
creditors did not know what assets were out there, they could hardly be
expected to plead that Argentina’s assets were amenable to execution under
the FSIA.55 The Court did not engage with the appropriateness of
transnational enforcement discovery generally. It simply assumed, without
deciding, that such discovery was appropriate in this case.
Justice Ginsburg authored a highly economical but pointed dissent. She
abandoned her tack at oral argument that the execution immunities in the
FSIA necessarily included restrictions on discovery, but launched a subtler
attack on the majority’s reasoning. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69
refers judgment creditors to state procedures for discovery56 and execution
and, acting in concert with them, imposes the restriction that asset discovery
be “relevant” to satisfaction of the judgment.57 Justice Ginsburg queried:
How can discovery of assets not available for seizure be relevant to
satisfaction of the judgment? She echoed the widely held belief that
American discovery is broad to the point of offending other sovereigns and
suggested, presumptively at least, that a U.S. court should look to U.S. law
for its assumptions as to what is or is not open for seizure and therefore
relevant for purposes of discovery.58

51. See, e.g., id. at 34.
52. Id. at 52.
53. See id. at 42–44.
54. See id. at 48.
55. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2256–57.
56. Rule 69 also permits creditors to seek discovery under federal law. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 69(a)(2).
57. See id. 26(b)(1); infra note 80 and accompanying text.
58. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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A. Merits Vs. Enforcement Discovery
The Court seems to have settled the application of the FSIA to
transnational asset discovery. But the Court did nothing to shed light on
whether and when transnational enforcement discovery, as a general matter,
is available. Indeed, the split between the majority and Justice Ginsburg
highlighted the absence of guiding authority on transnational discovery in
aid of enforcement.
The overriding reason for this absence of authority, and the resulting
confusion on display in the clashing NML opinions, is that courts have
consistently failed to appreciate the differences between merits discovery
and enforcement discovery. In fact, the two mechanisms are similar only in
that they both lead to the production of information. Beyond that, they have
different purposes, different standards, different presumptions, different
means to deter bad faith conduct, and differing sovereign interests. These
differences must be analyzed in order to formulate workable approaches to
transnational enforcement discovery.
1. Purposes
Pretrial merits discovery serves a multitude of purposes: “to avoid
surprise and the possible miscarriage of justice, to disclose fully the nature
and scope of the controversy, to narrow, simplify, and frame the issues
involved, and to enable a party to obtain the information needed to prepare
for trial.”59 The revisions that liberalized discovery under the Federal Rules
flowed from the “utopian” principle that “better mutual knowledge would
enable the two sides to agree on the facts and issues, settle more cases, and
reduce the number of issues and length of trials.”60
This is the central irony of pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules
(widely followed by the states)61: It was made broader to better narrow the
civil justice process further down the road, at trial or in settlement
negotiations.62 To put it mildly, the ability of liberal pretrial discovery to
achieve these purposes has come under heavy criticism. The Supreme
Court observed: “It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery . . . has
a significant potential for abuse. This abuse is not limited to matters of
delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests
of litigants and third parties.”63 This experience (particularly with the

59. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 2014) (Purposes and Problems of Discovery).
60. WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 234
(1968).
61. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986).
62. Jeffrey W. Stempel & David F. Herr, Applying Amended Rule 26(B)(1) in Litigation:
The New Scope of Discovery, 199 F.R.D. 396, 406 (2001) (“[P]ermitting reasonable
discovery under a claim or defense standard would appear to meet the original rulemakers’
hope that discovery would encourage not only accurate adjudication but also settlement or
the dropping of weak claims.”).
63. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34–35 (1984).
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massive costs of e-discovery) has led to a long running “containment”
movement in pretrial discovery.64 Courts and commentators have made
clear that pretrial discovery is “not designed to permit a plaintiff to make
broad-based allegations without any basis for a belief in those allegations
and then to invade the defendant’s records in an attempt to determine
whether or not a cause of action exists.”65 These concerns motivated, in
part, the Court’s decisions to tighten pleading standards such that
unsupported allegations could be quickly culled at the motion to dismiss
stage.66
Post-judgment asset discovery, however, serves not the purposes of
adjudication but the very different purposes of judgment enforcement. Von
Mehren and Trautman touched on these purposes in their seminal work on
recognition of foreign judgments.67 They identified the purposes, among
others, of promoting satisfaction of judgments, frustrating the attempts of
scofflaw debtors, and ensuring that the mere location of the defendant’s
assets does not become the determinative factor in choosing a forum to
adjudicate the dispute.68
These different purposes manifest themselves in the details of
enforcement discovery in numerous ways. For example, creditors are
entitled to begin asset discovery with phenomenally broad (by the standards
of pretrial discovery) requests that are essentially aimed at uncovering “all
matter relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment,”69 including “any and
all” assets in which the debtors have an interest, whether in the debtor’s
hands or in that of a third party (often referred to as a garnishee).70 These
requests can be directed to the debtor, a garnishee, or any other party that
could have any information that could lead to the debtor’s assets.
There are numerous reasons for this breadth. In pretrial discovery, the
plaintiff is presumed to have some knowledge of the defendant’s alleged
misdeeds. Indeed, the plaintiff must have such information to satisfy the
standards of notice pleading and to survive a motion to dismiss.71 A newly
minted judgment or award creditor frequently has no information
whatsoever about the debtor’s assets—or in the words of Justice Scalia’s
NML opinion: “[T]he reason for these subpoenas is that NML does not yet
know what property Argentina has and where it is, let alone whether it is
executable under the relevant jurisdiction’s law.”72
In addition to breadth, post-judgment discovery must be fast. In a
manual issued by the Department of Justice, the government observes that
64. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV.
747 (1998).
65. 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 59, § 2001.
66. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
67. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 12.
68. See id. at 1603–04.
69. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5223 (McKinney 2015).
70. Young v. Torelli, 522 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (App. Div. 1987).
71. See Dennis J. Connolly, Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Requirements in Preference and
Fraudulent-Transfer Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2010, at 22.
72. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014).
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assets not seized in the first nine months are likely never to be seized at
all.73 Certainly, pretrial discovery is not designed to move slowly.
Recollections fade, documents are lost or are deleted, witnesses move away
or die.74 But the defendant is not presumed to be hiding or secreting
evidence such that the adjudicative function of the court will be frustrated.
If they do, spoliation penalties loom. Not so post-judgment.75
Von Mehren and Trautman also observed that a functioning judgment
enforcement system should frustrate the tactics of scofflaw debtors. This
has some overlap, of course, with their statement that a judgment
enforcement system should be fast and efficient. Nevertheless, it has
additional implications for post-judgment discovery. For example, scofflaw
debtors frequently attempt to transfer their assets to nominal third parties, to
trusts that will shield the assets from enforcements, or to creditors that they
would rather pay ahead of their current antagonist.76 Enforcement activities
are frequently directed at uncovering and clawing back these “fraudulent
conveyances.”77 This requires discovery not only of assets currently owned
by the debtor, or information reasonably calculated to lead to assets
currently owned by the debtor, but also of information on any assets that
may have been owned by the debtor during the pendency of the dispute or
the debt.
In NML, the Court encountered the last and perhaps least obvious of the
von Mehren and Trautman purposes of judgment enforcement: that the
forum where the debtor’s assets are located not perforce become the forum
of adjudication.78 This purpose directly informs the availability of
transnational enforcement discovery.
Von Mehren and Trautman’s framework acknowledges that creditors
often must go beyond the forum of adjudication to obtain satisfaction of a
judgment. This typically cannot happen without the assistance of various
courts—the courts of other sovereigns, who recognize and enforce the
judgment and, as important, the judgment-rendering court, which, by
compelling broad enforcement discovery, assists the judgment creditor in
finding which sovereigns have territorial power over the debtor’s assets.
Perhaps it was once true that this process of locating a debtor’s assets
could occur without discovery. Some assets—buildings, equipment, oil
tankers, private planes—are easier to locate than others—brokerage
73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUDGMENT COLLECTION MANUAL, available at
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/JCM2004/04jcmtax.htm (last visited Apr. 23,
2015).
74. See, e.g., Estrada v. Burnham, 341 S.E.2d 538, 544 (N.C. 1986) (“With the passage
of time, memories fade or fail altogether, witnesses die or move away, evidence is lost or
destroyed . . . .”).
75. See infra Part I.A.4.
76. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
77. Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REV. 495, 495 (1983)
(“Since the enactment of the Statute of Elizabeth in the sixteenth century, fraudulent
conveyance law has protected creditors by invalidating certain transactions that render
debtors’ assets unreachable.”).
78. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 12, at 1603–04.
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accounts, wire transfers, LLC interests. It is certainly true, however, that
these other assets, intangible property that in practice cannot be located
without discovery, have become dominant.79
Von Mehren and Trautman’s third purpose of judgment enforcement
highlights the essential cleavage in transnational asset discovery. Some
courts have viewed post-judgment discovery as a floodlight, designed to
illuminate the debtor’s assets anywhere in the world, such that the creditor
can seek them out, domesticate its U.S. judgment in those jurisdictions, and
seize those assets. Other courts have viewed post-judgment discovery as
narrow and focused—a spotlight designed to reveal those assets seizable in
the rendering court’s territorial jurisdiction. This split represents not just a
divide on the appropriate use of post-judgment asset discovery but a
disagreement on the fundamental nature of judgments. Some courts have
embraced a world in which a judgment rendered in a significant commercial
or tort suit almost certainly will be used (or could be used) transnationally.
Others have continued to conceive of judgments as fundamentally local:
what other sovereigns do with a U.S. judgment is their business.
In U.S. federal court, post-judgment discovery is governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 69, which states that “[i]n aid of the judgment or
execution, the judgment creditor . . . may obtain discovery from any
person—including the judgment debtor—as provided in these rules or by
the procedure of the state where the court is located.”80 State law typically
provides that creditors may obtain discovery of “all matter relevant to the
satisfaction of [a] judgment.”81
When considering requests for transnational enforcement discovery,
many federal courts have interpreted these provisions to provide that “[a]
judgment creditor is entitled to discover the identity and location of any of
the judgment debtor’s assets, wherever located.”82 These courts certainly
allow that discovery “should be reasonably calculated to lead to assets that
can be levied upon pursuant to a writ of execution,”83 but reject the notion
that “discovery is limited to material likely to lead to discovery of assets

79. See Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
(forthcoming 2015); see also CAROL CORRADO, CHARLES HULTEN & DANIEL SICHEL, FED.
RESERVE BD., INTANGIBLE CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2006/200624/200624pap.pdf (concluding that a
majority of all U.S. corporate assets are intangible).
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2). The relevant provision for merits discovery under the
Federal Rules is Rule 26(b)(1), which in turn provides: “Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Id.
26(b)(1). Rule 69(a) discovery is subject to the same limitations as that of Rule 26, which
provides that a party may obtain information “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.” Id.
81. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5223 (McKinney 2014).
82. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1982); see also
Credit Lyonnais, S.A. v. SGC Int’l, Inc., 160 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
federal law “allows judgment creditors to conduct full post-judgment discovery to aid in
executing judgment”).
83. Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, No. 81 Civ. 7619 (MEL), 1989 WL 57704, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 24, 1989).
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subject to [the rendering court’s] writ.”84 These courts have rejected the
local or territorial view on a variety of grounds. They have reasoned that
Rule 69 embodies an intent “to provide the post-judgment creditor with an
efficient means of uncovering the existence of assets upon which he may
levy to satisfy the judgment.”85
These courts also have expressed a belief that it is appropriate for the
judgment-rendering court to take an active role in guiding the creditor’s
search for assets around the globe. The rendering court should not require
“judgment creditors to serve interrogatories upon [judgment debtors], from
each jurisdiction, that asked only about assets in that jurisdiction.”86
Moreover, “[t]here is no reason why, simply because the judgment must be
registered in each district in which execution is sought, discovery as to
assets must occur in each jurisdiction.”87 These courts also have noted that
Rule 69 has been given a broad construction in numerous other contexts, for
example in permitting discovery from third parties, even if they are not
charged with holding executable assets.88 In a seminal decision, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the notion “that a party is entitled to seek
discovery of information only with respect to the state in which the action is
pending.”89 The court stated simply: “A judgment creditor is entitled to
discover the identity and location of any of the judgment debtor’s assets,
wherever located.”90
State courts mostly have taken a similar approach. New York courts, for
example, have strongly endorsed generous enforcement discovery. One
court noted that “public policy mandates that no obstacle be put in the path
of a judgment creditor seeking to enforce the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction.”91 It held that the creditor could pursue discovery
of “funds outside the jurisdiction” which would then “be subject to
[attachment under] the laws of the situs jurisdiction.”92 Another New York
trial court held Bank of America in contempt for failing to respond to
extraterritorial asset discovery, noting that “[t]he dispute involves New
York residents,” that “the New York Court had jurisdiction over the parties
84. Id.
85. Dering v. Pitassi, No. 88-2278, 1988 WL 115806, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 1988)
(emphasis added); see also SEC v. Guieseppe, No. 81-1836, 1987 WL 9415, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 3, 1987) (noting that intent of Rule 69 is to provide “an effective and efficient means of
securing the execution of judgments”).
86. Minpeco, 1989 WL 57704, at *2.
87. Id.
88. See id.; Caisson Corp. v. Cnty. W. Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 334–35 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (granting order requiring the sole stockholder of debtor corporation to answer
questions concerning entities with which the debtor has or had a relationship); Monticello
Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 12 F.R.D. 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (granting order
compelling the attorney for plaintiff to answer questions concerning payment in aid of
execution of a judgment entered for defendants).
89. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1982).
90. Id.; see also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Fisher, 422 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
91. Raji v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 529 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423–24 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (citing Siemens
& Halske v. Gres, 354 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973)).
92. Id.; see also Gavilanes v. Matavosian, 475 N.Y.S.2d 987, 988 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
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initially,” that “[t]he judgment was rendered in New York and New York
has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its subpoenas in supplementary
proceedings,” and that “[t]he court can find no legal nor practical reason
why the bank should not respond.”93 The court added that “Plaintiff still
has a long road to hoe to reach judgment debtors[’] funds but the Bank’s
refusal to answer [the discovery request] is not justified.”94
New York courts did not exactly have legislative encouragement in
crafting a robust approach to transnational enforcement discovery. New
York Judiciary Law section 2-b “bars the service of a New York subpoena
outside the state no matter how much justification there may be for it.”95
But New York courts, “[r]ealizing that it’s unfair, if not absurd, to impede
the collection of a duly rendered New York judgment by the imposition of
an artificial restriction such as that imposed by [Judiciary Law] § 2-b,” have
“often found ways around it.”96 Following the courts’ lead, the New York
legislature passed C.P.L.R. 5224(a-1), “an amendment enacted in 2006,
establish[ing] the extraterritorial reach of a subpoena duces tecum,
subjecting a corporation to ‘the full disclosure prescribed by [CPLR 5223]
whether the materials sought are in the possession, custody or control of the
[corporation] within or without the state.’”97
U.S. federal courts have taken a similarly enthusiastic approach to postarbitral award discovery. For example, Judge Alvin Hellerstein of the
Southern District of New York considered one award creditor’s efforts—in
his words, “yet another episode in the saga of petitioner and judgment
creditor[’s] . . . efforts to collect on its judgment”—to collect on an English
arbitral award issued two years earlier.98 The award creditor had obtained
recognition of the award in New York and issued discovery requests on
several garnishee banks, including for information from Bank of India’s
Mumbai branch office. The Bank of India “limit[ed] its responses to
materials available from within its New York branch,” but by doing so,
“misconstrued the scope of its obligations under New York law.”99 The
court stated that “[t]here is no question that [the creditor] served its
subpoenas on Bank of India in state, by service upon Bank of India’s New
York branch,” nor “is there any question that [the creditor] seeks the
93. Gavilanes, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
94. Id. The court asked, perhaps channeling the creditor’s frustration: “How onerous
can it be to comply with the request, when the account number of the judgment debtor is
provided on the subpoena?” Id.
95. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224 cmt. C5224:5 (McKinney 2014) (author Richard C. Reilly,
recompiling David D. Siegel’s commentary); see also DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 383 (4th ed. 2005).
96. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5224 cmt. C5224:5 (author Richard C. Reilly, recompiling David D.
Siegel’s commentary); see also Coutts Bank (Switz.) Ltd. v. Anatian, 713 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47–
48 (App. Div. 2000); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Waterfront Comm., 371 N.E.2d 453, 455
(N.Y. 1977).
97. CE Int’l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P’ship, No. 12-CV08087(CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5224(a-1)).
98. Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Bank of India, 827 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
99. Id. at 237–38.
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production of materials in Bank of India’s possession, custody, or
control.”100 Therefore, the “Bank of India must produce the materials [the
creditor] seeks, even if those materials are located outside New York.”101
Granted, arbitral awards are more clearly transnational creatures.
Enforcement of arbitral awards is governed by the New York Convention, a
treaty signed by over 150 countries.102 There are vigorous debates about
the transnational character of arbitral awards—such as the effects of a set
aside at the seat of the arbitration on the enforcement of the award103—but
many arbitrators and arbitral institutions have adopted the position that they
have an affirmative obligation to ensure enforceability of the award,104
including some consideration of where assets are located.105 Similarly,
many commentators have pushed courts to take a more active role in
ensuring enforceability of awards, including vigorous use of interim
measures.106
But this distinction may be less than it seems. American states have
adopted a remarkably open approach to enforcement of foreign
judgments—a decision not without cost.107 This openness comes not from
magnanimity but from the hope and desire that U.S. judgments will be well
received abroad.108 In light of this policy, it would be strange indeed for
U.S. courts to treat U.S. judgments and judgment enforcement discovery as
if they were purely local in scope.
2. Relevance
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 states that “[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s

100. Id. at 238.
101. Id.
102. Two New State Parties to the New York Convention, 1958 N.Y. CONVENTION GUIDE,
http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=cmspage&pageid=7&id_news=467
(last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
103. See, e.g., Filip De Ly, Forum Shopping and the Determination of the Place of
Arbitration, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
CONTEXT 53 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2013) [hereinafter FORUM SHOPPING]; Loukas Mistelis,
Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards and Forum Shopping in International Arbitration:
Delocalization, Party Autonomy and National Courts in Post-Award Review, in FORUM
SHOPPING, supra, at 277; Linda Silberman & Maxi Scherer, Forum-Shopping and PostAward Judgments, in FORUM SHOPPING, supra, at 313.
104. See Martin Platte, An Arbitrator’s Duty to Render Enforceable Award, 20 J. INT’L
ARB. 307, 307 (2003). But see Christopher Boog & Benjamin Moss, The Lazy Myth of the
Arbitral Tribunal’s Duty to Render an Enforceable Award, KLUEWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 28,
2013),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/01/28/the-lazy-myth-of-the-arbitraltribunals-duty-to-render-an-enforceable-award/.
105. See Platte, supra note 104, at 312–13.
106. Id.
107. See Christopher A. Whytock, Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization” of
Transnational Litigation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 467, 468 (2013).
108. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 175–76 (2008); see also Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?,
31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 205–06 (2013).
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claim or defense.”109 In addition, “[f]or good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.”110 The concept of relevance is the key check on unbridled,
overbroad pretrial discovery.
Jeffrey Stempel and David Herr, writing on the 2000 amendments to
Rule 26 intended to narrow the scope of available pretrial discovery,
observed that, for the first standard, “[a]n item of information sought is
relevant to a claim or defense if the requesting party can articulate a logical
relationship between the information sought and possible proof or refutation
of the claim or defense at trial.”111 On the good cause standard, Stempel
and Herr wrote that a party requesting discovery not logically related to a
current claim or defense should show the information’s importance to the
case, the likelihood of obtaining the information, and that the probity of the
information will outweigh “the purported discovery vices of increased cost,
delay, or harassment.”112 Even “[i]f the requesting party makes this
showing, the opponent may still be able to avoid this discovery if it can
demonstrate that the burden of the subject-matter discovery outweighs its
benefit.”113
Enforcement discovery must be “relevant” to execution—but this
connection is necessarily loose. The information sought need not lead to
assets subject to the power of the court issuing discovery. The information
could well be for the purpose of guiding the creditor to other jurisdictions
where it would domesticate its judgment and use the execution processes of
those courts.
Judge Clifford Scott Green observed that “the limits of the concept of
relevancy in connection with discovery in aid of execution of judgment, as
here, must be somewhat different,” because “of the fact that there is no
longer an action pending which may be utilized by reference to its subject
matter to assist in definition of the scope of discoverable matter.”114 Judge
Green set broad limits on discovery from third-party garnishees, stating that
discovery must be relevant to finding assets of the judgment debtor and
cannot be used for harassment or to discover assets of the third party itself
and that, “[m]ore significantly, it is clear that in an attempt to discover

109. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
110. Id.
111. Stempel & Herr, supra note 62, at 408–09.
112. Id. at 421. Stempel and Herr identify the following factors:
[T]he reason the information is important to the case; the reason that the
information is at least potentially likely to emerge from the discovery requested;
and why permitting the discovery will be more consistent with full factual
development and accurate adjudication rather than furthering the purported
discovery vices of increased cost, delay, or harassment of others. If the requesting
party makes this showing, the opponent may still be able to avoid this discovery if
it can demonstrate that the burden of the subject-matter discovery outweighs its
benefit.
Id.
113. Id.
114. Caisson Corp. v. Cnty. W. Bldg. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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assets by which to satisfy its judgment, plaintiff is entitled to a very
thorough examination of the judgment debtor.”115
Courts taking this approach have noted that discovery proceedings and
execution proceedings are separate.116 Indeed, Rule 69 separates them into
two provisions.117 This approach also necessarily implies that a judgmentrendering or enforcing court views a judgment as transnational. A U.S.
court rendering or enforcing a judgment accepts that the creditor is likely to
take that judgment abroad to further its search for assets.
The related, and perhaps, necessary conclusion that follows from this
premise is that creditors enjoy a strong presumption in favor of
transnational enforcement discovery. Creditors clearly enjoy the ability to
obtain information from the debtor or from third parties that could, even in
attenuated fashion, lead to the debtor’s assets. This includes shining a light
on the debtor’s assets around the world and, if third-party garnishees are
subject to the court’s adjudicative jurisdiction, any assets held by thirdparty garnishees anywhere in the world.
David Siegel, the dean of New York state civil procedure scholars,
considered what is “matter relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment” and
noted that “[t]his is a generous standard and permits the creditor a broad
range of inquiry through either the judgment debtor or any third person with
light to shed on the debtor’s property, present or potential” and that any
“attempt to delineate the inquiries that can be made or the materials that can
be elicited would be futile.”118
Some federal courts, however, have taken an approach akin to pretrial
discovery, requiring some threshold showing of relevance before
compelling discovery against third-party garnishees. For example, one
federal district court—essentially adopting the timing argument later
advanced by Argentina before the Supreme Court—stated that, at the
outset, “a judgment creditor must make a threshold showing of necessity
and relevance when attempting to obtain discovery of a non-judgment
debtor pursuant to Rule 69(a).”119 Without this showing, the court reasoned
that it could not answer the “crucial question” of whether the financial
records sought would lead to satisfaction of the judgment.120 In this
instance, the creditor was attempting to identify and claw back fraudulent
transfers. However, the court held the creditor’s “desire to void [the
allegedly fraudulent] transactions is too far removed from a present ‘aid of
the judgment or execution’ as contemplated by Rule 69(a).”121
A New York court recently took a similarly narrow approach. The
judgment had traveled a somewhat circuitous route to New York. The
115. Id. at 335.
116. See, e.g., Mid-Dakota Clinic, P.C. v. Kolsrud, 603 N.W.2d 475, 476 (N.D. 1999).
117. See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a).
118. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5223 cmt. C5223:2 (McKinney 2014) (author Richard C. Reilly,
recompiling David D. Siegel’s commentary) (“Relevancy is the central theme.”).
119. Blaw Knox Corp. v. AMR Indus., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 404.
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creditor obtained a Lebanese judgment, obtained recognition of the foreign
money judgment in Maryland, and then registered the judgment as a sister
state judgment in New York. The judgment creditor then attempted to
obtain discovery from a foreign bank by serving its New York branch.122
The discovery requests encompassed any assets of the debtor in any foreign
branch of the bank.123 The bank refused to respond on the grounds of the
separate entity rule and foreign secrecy laws that it alleged would subject
the bank to civil and criminal penalties if it and its employees complied
with the discovery requests.124
The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel, first because the
plaintiff could not prove that any of the judgment debtor’s activities had
taken place in New York. Second, the court stated that discovery was but
the first step toward execution, and because assets were not located in the
jurisdiction, discovery efforts would seem wasteful: “For the Court to start
down this path, knowing that the ultimate goal is unavailable in this
jurisdiction, would be an unproductive waste of judicial resources.”125 The
First Department, the state intermediate appellate court for Manhattan,
upheld that decision, suggesting that the denial was appropriate because the
“underlying dispute did not originate in the United States, the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters provides an alternative recourse, and ordering compliance raises the
risk of undermining important interests of other nations by potentially
conflicting with their privacy laws or regulations.”126
3. Due Process
Due process gives defendants the right to be free from the power of
sovereigns with whom they have no contacts. Due process interests also
give defendants the right to be free from needlessly burdensome
discovery.127 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 embodies this value,
among others, in giving courts the power to limit discovery where “the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.”128
The “burden” on a party engaged in pretrial discovery weighs far more
heavily than the “burden” on a judgment debtor. The calculus changes
because the due process interests of a judgment debtor have either been

122. Ayyash v. Koleilat, 957 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
123. Id. at 579–80.
124. Id. at 579.
125. Id. at 582.
126. Ayyash v. Koleilat, 981 N.Y.S.2d 536, 536 (App. Div. 2014) (internal citations
omitted).
127. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Jordan M. Schwartz, Can EDiscovery Violate Due Process? Part 1, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS (June 7, 2013), available
at http://www.skadden.com/insights/can-e-discovery-violate-due-process-part-1.
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(iii).
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extinguished by the judgment129 or significantly reduced.130 The gulf
between a defendant and a debtor is best illustrated by one profound
difference—a defendant cannot be haled into court wherever it has
property; a debtor can.131
Courts have little solicitude for the “burden” of judgment or award
debtors. The due process interests of the debtor are reduced—accordingly
the debtor has little ground to object to the necessarily broad and
encompassing discovery request of asset discovery. The debtor also holds
the keys to its own salvation. This need not consist simply of paying the
judgment, although that is certainly an option. The debtor typically can
obtain a stay of discovery as of right by posting a supersedeas bond.132 The
bond secures the creditor’s judgment and obviates the need for recourse to
the debtor’s assets. Accordingly, appeal of the judgment can proceed at its
usual stately pace. Judgment debtors are loath to do this. If the object of
the exercise is to avoid paying a judgment, posting collateral for a bond in
the home of the enforcing court will necessarily be unattractive. Of course,
if the debtor’s sole object is to avoid paying a valid judgment, it should not
be heard to complain of burdens.
Debtors have had their due process interests diminished by the rendering
of a judgment or an award against them—but not so with garnishees.
Garnishees are mere third parties caught holding the debtor’s assets.
Garnishees, like third-party witnesses, are presumed to have “no dog in
th[e] fight.”133 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this principle in
holding that, in some circumstances, a third-party witness may immediately
appeal a discovery order because “the third party presumably lacks a
sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing
compliance.”134 The Federal Rules recognize this burden by requiring that
courts balance the need for the information with the expense imposed135
and by empowering courts to quash subpoenas that impose an undue burden
on a third party.136
The Court has never directly recognized that third-party witnesses enjoy
any due process protection from assertions of jurisdiction, but most courts
129. See generally James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, Personal Jurisdiction and the New
York Convention, INT’L LITIG., Summer 2012, at 2.
130. See Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Meets International Arbitration: A Tribute
to Hans Smit, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 439, 444 (2012) (arguing that, although the Shaffer
distinction between pre- and post-judgment is relevant for both award and judgment
enforcement actions, it is nevertheless “surprising and indefensible” to hold “that a foreign
country judgment may be enforced in New York without the necessity of having jurisdiction
over the judgment debtor or his property”).
131. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 309 n.14 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210–11 nn.36–37 (1976)).
132. See 11 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 59, § 2905 (Stay upon Appeal).
133. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998). See generally
Ryan W. Scott, Minimum Contacts, No Dog: Evaluating Personal Jurisdiction for Nonparty
Discovery, 88 MINN. L. REV. 968 (2004).
134. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992).
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(3).
136. Id. 45(d)(3)(iv).
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have assumed as much as each discovery request carries with it the
possibility of a contempt judgment.137 Of course, a judgment on liability
and a contempt judgment are very different creatures, but “it is unclear
which way that should cut.”138 However, the Second Circuit held that a
foreign company could be compelled to provide testimony in New York,
even though jurisdiction was obtained only by service of process, because
“a person who is subjected to liability by service of process far from home
may have better cause to complain of an outrage to fair play than one
similarly situated who is merely called upon to supply documents or
testimony.”139 The Second Circuit also rejected the argument that a nonparty witness should “command solicitude simply because it is an entity
foreign to New York and the United States.”140
The related law of seizing assets from garnishees also sheds light on this
question. The burden of responding to broad discovery requests is not the
only or even the most important burden. Due process interests require that
the court be aware of the hardship of criminal prosecution that could be
leveled at a third-party garnishee after complying with American
discovery.141 And yet, U.S. courts have little patience for noncompliant
garnishees facing criminal prosecution as a result of seizure of assets.142
Numerous courts have observed, in effect, that if a multinational entity
cannot comply with the demands of U.S. law, perhaps it should relinquish
the privileges of doing business in the United States.143 Courts have carved
out a sort of exception for multinationals that could not reasonably
anticipate being caught between the demands of U.S. law and the
requirements of another sovereign.144 This exception has seldom been
applied—and, at the least, it certainly does not apply to banks, the entity
that most typically finds itself in the uncomfortable position of holding a
debtor’s assets that one sovereign would seize and another would shield.145
This rough treatment of third-party banks at the hands of U.S. courts may
be surprising, but it reflects the conclusion that these multinational
garnishees had adequate notice that they could be subjected to the
irreconcilable demands of multiple sovereigns and, indeed, that these
137. See Scott, supra note 133, at 978.
138. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1998).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275,
1277 (7th Cir. 1990).
142. In the pointed words of the Second Circuit: “If the Bank cannot, as it were, serve
two masters and comply with the lawful requirements both of the United States and [a
foreign country], perhaps it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges
received therefrom.” First Nat’l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1959).
143. If a defendant or garnishee has “voluntarily elected to do business in numerous
foreign host countries,” it “has accepted the incidental risk of occasional inconsistent
governmental actions [and] cannot expect to avail itself of the benefits of doing business
here without accepting the concomitant obligations.” United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia,
740 F.2d 817, 828 (11th Cir. 1984).
144. See Simowitz, supra note 79.
145. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Motorola, Inc., 846 N.Y.S.2d 171, 181 (App.
Div. 2007).
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multinationals have derived substantial benefit from operating across
sovereign boundaries. Moreover, third-party garnishees have typically
derived benefits from holding the debtors’ assets—a bank deposit,
brokerage account, or electronic funds transfer all being excellent examples.
There would seem to be little reason to be more solicitous of third parties
in discovery proceedings than in garnishment proceedings. It therefore
appears that the interests of debtors and their third-party garnishees must be
viewed as altered in post-judgment proceedings.146
4. Sanctions for Misconduct
Discovery requests in the United States are broad by design but are not
without limits. A party responding to merits discovery always has the
opportunity to decide for itself whether a particular document is relevant or
privileged.147 But there are tools in place to punish parties that exercise this
power in bad faith, such as issuing an adverse inference, contempt penalties,
or dismissal of claims.148
These remedies are ineffectual in post-judgment practice. In a merits
proceeding, an adverse inference or dismissal of claims are powerful tools.
In post-judgment practice, they are irrelevant.149 Similarly, a contempt
sanction is normally something that parties in merits litigation strive to
avoid. In post-judgment practice, a contempt judgment means little to a
scofflaw debtor with an already outstanding and unsatisfied judgment
(although it still can be very persuasive to a garnishee). For these reasons,
the debtor does not and should not have the freedom to decide what is
“relevant” to a post-judgment discovery request.
Indeed, the clashing NML opinions highlight this difference, albeit
without explicit acknowledgement. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejects
the argument that “if a judgment creditor could not ultimately execute a
judgment against certain property, then it has no business pursuing
146. Third-party witnesses are also still protected by the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45, which state, inter alia, that no witness shall be commanded to appear
more than “100 miles [from] where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts
business in person.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A).
147. See, e.g., Ann K. Hadrava, The Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) Scope of Discovery: An Empirical Analysis of Its Potential “Relevancy” to
Employment Discrimination Actions, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1111 (2001).
148. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding that
“District Court’s orders imposing sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(b) for the Bank’s failure to comply with several of that court’s discovery-related orders”);
see also Paul Robert Eckert, Utilizing the Doctrine of Adverse Interferences When Foreign
Illegality Prohibits Discovery: A Proposed Alternative, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 749, 787
(1996); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery
Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1978) (noting that “some courts, including the
Supreme Court in a brief per curiam opinion, have suggested that indulgence of discovery
abuses and the narrowly remedial orientation toward discovery sanctions are inappropriate in
light of the need to deter all litigants from exploiting the dilatory potential of discovery,” and
that “[t]hese courts have urged that such deterrence requires the use of sanctions whose
effect is more directly punitive”).
149. There are exceptions, such as litigation at the enforcement stage of issues such as
alter ego liability or against garnishees.

2015]

TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT DISCOVERY

3317

discovery of information pertaining to that property,” noting that the very
“reason for these subpoenas is that NML does not yet know what property
Argentina has and where it is, let alone whether it is executable under the
relevant jurisdiction’s law.”150 These statements embody an assumption
that courts will decide what is and is not executable.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent singles out this passage in particular for
disagreement. She states that “[w]ithout proof of any kind that other
nations broadly expose a foreign sovereign’s property to arrest,” a creditor’s
enforcement discovery should be limited to categories of assets made
available for seizure by U.S. law.151 This approach allows the debtor to
decide what assets are or are not available for execution. In pretrial
discovery, this is standard—the producing party has the power to decide for
itself what is responsive to discovery requests. If the producing party
believes that responsive documents are shielded by privilege, it typically
produces a privilege log, which allows an adversarial examination of
privilege claims.152 But, naturally, these obligations become bound up in
the gamesmanship of litigation.153 Strong sanctions provide both specific
and general deterrence of bad faith conduct.154
Post-judgment, these sanctions are ineffective—but the incentive for
gamesmanship is that much stronger. Accordingly, the initial determination
of what assets could be available to satisfy the judgment or award cannot be
placed in the debtor’s hands but must reside with the court.155
5. Cost and Abusive Practices
Concerns about the “cost and delay” inherent in U.S. civil discovery have
become ubiquitous, particularly with the rise of electronic discovery.156
150. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014).
151. Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also 8
WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 59, § 2016 (Assertion of Privilege).
153. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 265 (D. Md. 2008)
(“In actuality, lawyers infrequently provide all the basic information called for in a privilege
log, and if they do, it is usually so cryptic that the log falls far short of its intended goal of
providing sufficient information to the reviewing court to enable a determination to be
made.”).
154. Id. (noting that counsel “should be wary of filing a response to a Rule 34 document
production request that asserts privilege/protection as a basis for refusing to make requested
production without having a factual basis to support each element of each
privilege/protection claimed for each document withheld, because doing so is a sanctionable
violation”).
155. Justice Ginsburg’s proposal would appear to allow creditor’s to prove that a foreign
sovereign would open up more assets than the United States to execution. This would
require the creditor, operating without knowledge of the nature or extent of the debtor’s
assets, to make a showing for multiple countries regarding multiple types of assets,
presumably involving extensive briefing and testimony on foreign law. This system would
trade greater solicitude for debtors (particularly foreign sovereign) for an enormous loss of
speed and even more post-judgment expense for valid creditors.
156. For an excellent examination of the origins and effects of this “cost and delay”
narrative, see Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform:
Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085 (2012).
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The U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
convened a conference of lawyers, federal judges, and legal scholars to
address exactly this issue in 2010 at Duke Law School. The conference
produced a proposed package of amendments to the Federal Rules to reduce
these perceived evils.157 One conference paper observed that the Federal
Rules’ stated goal “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action” may have become “an empty promise,” and
that “[c]ivil litigation has become too cumbersome, expensive and time
consuming, and the exponential growth of electronically stored
information . . . over the past decade has simply added strains to an already
overburdened system.”158
Courts enforcing judgments do not typically concern themselves with the
costs and expenses of the judgment debtor. Quite the contrary—the
judgment debtor is typically regarded as putting the creditor to further,
unnecessary, and unjust expense by refusing to satisfy the judgment.159
This conviction is reflected in the widespread adoption of post-judgment
interest rates that, at present, typically exceed market returns.160 High postjudgment interest rates compensate creditors for dispossession of their
funds over the dispute’s length and prevent unjust enrichment of debtors.
Post-judgment interest is also designed to promote speedy satisfaction of
judgments and discourage post-judgment gamesmanship by debtors.161
A third-party witness in enforcement proceedings, or even a garnishee,
faces lower burdens than a defendant in a plenary proceeding. One federal
district court observed that “it is well recognized that merely making a
submission to the court imposes a far less significant burden on that party
than bringing the party into a lawsuit.”162 The court noted that a subpoena
in aid of enforcement “imposes an even lighter burden than a typical
subpoena, which may delve into aspects of a company’s business that are
sensitive, and which may require extensive legal analysis as well as internal

157. See Federal Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Opens “Duke Rules
Package” for Comment, DUKE LAW (Aug. 22, 2013), http://law.duke.edu/news/federalcommittee-rules-practice-and-procedure-opens-duke-rules-package-comment/.
158. FED. COURTS COMM’N, ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., PROPOSALS FOR THE
2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2010),
available
at
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071920NYCBarProposalsforDukeConference.pdf.
159. See generally Note, Transfer of Assets Pending Stay of Execution As Contempt of
Court, 49 YALE L.J. 580 (1940).
160. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5004 (McKinney 2014); Minbeob
[Civil Act], Act. No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, art. 379 (S. Kor.); MINPO [MINPO] [CIV. C.] art. 404
(Japan); Código de Comercio [CCo.] [Commercial Code] art. 362 (Mex.).
161. See Thierry J. Senechal & John Y. Gotanda, Interest As Damages, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 491, 496 (2009) (“Without interest, the losing respondent’s obligations are
lessened. Because the resulting cost to the respondent for the breach is less, the respondent
may not be sufficiently deterred from breaching the contract. It may even delay the
resolution of the dispute, because the respondent profits from the use of the claimant’s
money while the dispute is in the process of being resolved.”).
162. Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., No. 4:13-MC-00874 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2014).
Special thanks to Trey Childress and Bryce Cullinane for pointing out this case.
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resources in crafting objections and providing responses.”163 By contrast,
for a subpoena in aid of enforcement: “[T]here is no discovery being asked
of the Garnishees beyond the amount of their indebtedness to the Judgment
Debtor. It is a question that can be answered in an instant.”164
The concern for “abusive” practices is also recast. Courts express great
frustration with the various practices of scofflaw debtors—for example,
fraudulent transfers—in an attempt to evade enforcement entirely or to
force the creditors to settle for a significant discount off the face value of
the judgment. Legislatures also have gone to great lengths to corral
recalcitrant debtors. New York law, for example, provides not only for
contempt sanctions for failure to obey a subpoena165 or a restraining
notice,166 but also for arrest of a debtor concealing property if the debtor is
about to leave the state or is concealed therein.167
6. Good and Bad Faith
The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
placed the issue of transnational discovery front and center. The
Restatement devoted a separate section to transnational discovery, carving it
off from jurisdiction to prescribe generally.168 This new section was
motivated, in part, by the belief that “[n]o aspect of the extension of the
American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States
has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in
investigation and litigation in the United States.”169 The Restatement’s new
section, however, was principally (perhaps exclusively) concerned with
“pretrial or investigative techniques,” particularly in antitrust cases.170
The Restatement, in some respects, made life much harder for parties
resisting U.S. discovery. In particular, it made explicit that the threat of
criminal sanctions by a foreign sovereign was not a sufficient basis to
withhold discovery.171 But the Restatement gave to noncompliant targets
of discovery in the same breadth that it took away. The Restatement also
added a “good faith” exception—in other words, that the discovery target
could be excused from production after making good faith efforts to secure
the compliance of the sovereign interposing objections to the discovery.172

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2308 (McKinney 2014).
Id. 5251.
Id. 5250; see also Assocs. v. Park, 949 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (App. Div. 2012).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 442 (1987).
169. Id. reporters’ cmt. 1.
170. Id.
171. Id. reporters’ cmt. 4; see also United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d
341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The fact that foreign law may subject a person to criminal
sanctions in the foreign country if he produces certain information does not automatically
bar a domestic court from compelling production.”).
172. In practice, this often results in a sort of unconvincing Kabuki where the discovery
target “asks” a sovereign for clearance to disclose, while making clear that it is acting under
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It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a “good faith” judgment
debtor would refuse to post a bond. Of course, not all judgments and
awards deserve to be enforced, hence the various provisions of judgment
enforcement law173 and of the New York Convention that permit limited
defenses to arbitral award enforcement.174 But for the court that has
rendered the judgment, defenses to enforcement are irrelevant; for a court
has already agreed to enforce a judgment, the time for defenses is past. The
only reason a debtor could have for refusing to post a bond, if it has assets
sufficient to do so, is that it never intends to satisfy the judgment. This
hardly seems consistent with “good faith”—even if the debtor could make
an apparently “good faith” attempt to secure clearance from the resistant
sovereign to release documents.
7. Sovereign Interests
The United States certainly has a strong interest in providing a forum for
adjudication for a wide variety of cases. The Restatement recognizes a nonexhaustive list of these cases, including matters involving residents,
nationals, and parties who have consented to jurisdiction in the United
States.175 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
the “the interests of the forum State” in narrowing both specific176 and
general jurisdiction.177
American states have also, in varying ways, expressed strong interests in
providing a forum of adjudication. For example, New York General
Obligations Law section 5-1402 provides that any person can sue a foreign
party in New York pursuant to a contract that provides for New York law
and the jurisdiction of New York courts, if the amount in controversy is at
least $1 million.178 New York law also bars any courts from dismissing
such a suit under forum non conveniens.179
The interest of a sovereign in ensuring enforcement of its judgments is
also certainly strong. Two federal courts of appeal have described this
interest as “vital.”180 Whenever a court issues an order, it “has put its own
prestige on the line to back up this commitment.”181 But it is not
compulsion. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 2011 WL
6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011).
173. See Emilio Bettoni, Note, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money
Judgments Despite the Lack of Assets, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 157 (2013).
174. New York Convention, supra note 18.
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 421.
176. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
177. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2014) (“[R]espondents have failed
to show that it would be more convenient to litigate in California than in Germany, a
sovereign with a far greater interest in resolving the dispute.”).
178. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2014).
179. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327(b) (McKinney 2014).
180. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir.
1992); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1280
(7th Cir. 1990).
181. Bray, supra note 31, at 1128.
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immediately clear how strong this interest is where a U.S. court is
recognizing and enforcing a foreign judgment or award.
In the context of arbitral awards, the analysis may be somewhat simpler.
Article III of the New York Convention provides that signatory states shall
not “impose[] substantially more onerous conditions” on the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards than on enforcement of domestic awards.182 The
United States might well violate its obligations under the Convention if its
courts announced a doctrine whereby international awards were less likely
to receive the full panoply of U.S. enforcement discovery than domestic
awards. In addition, current case law requires that an arbitral award cannot
be enforced in the United States without a jurisdictional nexus, either
through jurisdiction over the debtor or over its assets.183
Even for judgments, however, the U.S. interest is greater in enforcing a
foreign judgment than in adjudicating a purely foreign claim. In the United
States, judgment enforcement is governed by state law. Although there is
significant variation among state law approaches, they are fairly united as
“generous forum[s] in which to enforce judgments for money damages
rendered by foreign courts.”184 This is not noblesse oblige, but pure selfinterest. As the New York Court of Appeals observed, New York’s
judgment enforcement law “was designed to codify and clarify existing case
law on the subject and, more importantly, to promote the efficient
enforcement of New York judgments abroad by assuring foreign
jurisdictions that their judgments would receive streamlined enforcement
here.”185 American states have expressed their strong interest in providing
foreign judgments with the full breadth of enforcement mechanisms in the
hopes that foreign sovereigns will accord U.S. judgments the same
courtesy.
It is possible to understand the breadth of U.S. enforcement discovery in
the same way—as an affirmative statement of policy that broad postjudgment and post-award discovery should be a worldwide norm. The U.S.
Congress made exactly such a statement in passing the current version of 28
U.S.C. § 1782, which provides for U.S.-style discovery in aid of
proceedings before foreign tribunals. The United States created this
mechanism, which arguably disadvantages U.S.-based companies, “in the
hopes that foreign countries would be encouraged to reciprocate with
procedural improvements of their own.”186 U.S. laws on enforcement
182. New York Convention, supra note 18, at 2519.
183. See Silberman, supra note 130, at 444.
184. CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 792 N.E.2d 155, 159 (N.Y.
2003).
185. Id.
186. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
H.R. DOC. NO. 88-88, at 20 (1963)); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241, 248 (2004) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 was the culmination of a process to
“investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and cooperation between the
United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements.” (quoting Act of
Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743; S. Rep. No. 2392, at 3 (1958))). One
federal district court has specifically held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is not limited to “claimsbased” discovery, but can also be used for “asset-based” discovery. In re Application of
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discovery—for example, New York’s recent amendments to make clear the
extraterritorial application of its enforcement subpoenas—could be
construed as representing a similar U.S. interest.
At the very least, this interest outstrips the U.S. interest in adjudicating
the much maligned foreign-cubed action—a suit with foreign plaintiffs,
foreign defendants, and foreign conduct. The Supreme Court noted in its
most recent curbs to both prescriptive187 and adjudicative188 jurisdiction
that each case involved foreign parties and foreign conduct. At a minimum,
the U.S. interest in enforcing a purely foreign judgment likely exceeds its
interest in adjudicating a purely foreign controversy.189
The Restatement (and in turn, the Supreme Court) also assumed a basic
comparative point: that American discovery laws are far broader than, and
in constant tension with, the vast majority of other nations’ discovery
systems. Much of the Restatement’s analysis was therefore motivated by a
desire not to unreasonably aggravate sovereign tensions caused by this
difference. This may be true pretrial but perhaps not post-judgment. The
battle is not between American-style broad discovery and other nations’
focused document production but typically between a creditor from a state
that endorses broad post-judgment discovery and a debtor from a state that
also endorses broad post-judgment discovery.190
The United Kingdom, for example, takes a famously robust approach to
enforcement. Justice Ginsburg observed as much in her dissent to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance
Bond Fund,191 which held that due process bars “preliminary injunctions
stopping a party sued for an unsecured debt from disposing of assets
pending adjudication.”192 She noted that worldwide “preliminary assetGorsoan Ltd. & Gazprombank OJSC for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 to Conduct
Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No. 13 MISC. 397 PGG, 2014 WL 7232262, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2014). Disagreement remains, however, on whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782
authorizes discovery of documents held abroad by U.S. residents. See Application of Sarrio,
S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1997).
187. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 286 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[V]irtually all ‘foreign-cubed’ actions—actions in which
‘(1) foreign plaintiffs [are] suing (2) a foreign issuer in an American court for violations of
American securities laws based on securities transactions in (3) foreign countries’—would
fail . . . . Under these circumstances, the odds of the fraud having a substantial connection to
the United States are low.” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172
(2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted))); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1676 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Other countries
permit some form of lawsuit brought by a foreign national against a foreign national, based
upon conduct taking place abroad and seeking damages.”).
188. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
189. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
190. For a comparative analysis of prejudgment enforcement mechanisms prepared by
counsel for the Madoff trustee, see Timothy S. Pfeifer, Denise D. Vasel & Ralph A.
Siciliano, Offshore Asset Recovery: Investigations and Legal Proceedings, INT’L L.
PRACTICUM, Spring 2012, at 56 (“Many of these extraordinary remedies are not available
under New York or U.S. law.”).
191. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
192. Id. at 338 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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freeze injunctions have been available in English courts since the 1975
Court of Appeal decision in Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v.
International Bulkcarriers S.A.”193 She also observed that “increasingly
sophisticated foreign-haven judgment proofing strategies, coupled with
technology that permits the nearly instantaneous transfer of assets abroad,
suggests that defendants may succeed in avoiding meritorious claims in
ways unimaginable before the merger of law and equity.”194 In 2013, the
U.K. High Court reaffirmed the ability of English courts to issue worldwide
discovery orders to any parties subject to its jurisdiction.195 The House of
Lords did clarify, however, that a court’s discovery power did not extend to
third parties entirely outside the court’s jurisdiction—a third party could not
be compelled to travel to the United Kingdom to submit to jurisdiction and
examination there.196
Swiss law imposes a duty to disclose all the debtor’s assets, wherever
located, on the debtor, any third parties holding the debtor’s assets, or any
third parties who simply have information about the debtor’s assets.197
Failure to do so may subject the debtor or third parties to criminal
sanctions. Germany and Portugal have inquisitorial enforcement systems,
where an unsatisfied judgment is referred to a court officer who is
empowered to examine the debtor and to search various government records
for information on the debtor’s assets. If these fail to produce assets to
satisfy the judgment, the enforcement officer is empowered to make an
application to the court to seek information from third parties.198 Just this
snapshot of foreign approaches to post-judgment discovery suggests broad
agreement that all information about the debtor’s assets, even in the hands
of third parties, is generally available. This relatively broad approach
stands in stark contrast to the pretrial discovery system of, by way of
example, Germany, which has none.199

193. Id. at 339 (citing [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509).
194. Id. at 338–39 (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32–
38 (1996)).
195. See Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., [2013] EWHC (Comm) 1323.
196. See Masri v. Consol. Contractors Int’l Co., [2009] UKHL 43, [2010] 1 A.C. 90
(appeal taken from Eng.).
197. The Swiss Code of Civil Procedure, Part 2, Title 10: Enforcement of Decision,
Chapter 1, Article 335(2), provides that, “[i]f a decision relates to the payment of money or
provision of security, it is enforced according to the provisions of the [Debt Enforcement and
Bankruptcy Act],” which in turn imposes the obligation of the debtor and third parties. See
SR
272
Art.
335,
FED.
AUTHORITIES
SWISS
CONFEDERATION,
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/272/a335.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
198. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] 3202, as amended, §§ 802c, 802l (Ger.); Artigo 833.ºA (Diligências prévias à penhora).
199. Gregory P. Sreenan & Jeffrey B. Shalek, Blocking Statutes and Their Effect on
American-Style Discovery Abroad, BRIEF, Fall 1995, at 59–60 (“Germany’s system is set up
so that from the outset to the completion of the litigation process, the finder of fact and the
interpreter of law is the same person: the judge. The judge decides what witnesses the court
will hear, the judge alone questions the witnesses, and the judge records the testimony in
summary fashion.”).
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As for sovereigns, the NML Court does seem to have made clear that
U.S. courts should not look to provide more protections than those
conferred in the FSIA itself.
The U.S. Congress has enacted a
“comprehensive” scheme governing claims against foreign sovereigns and
The FSIA provides both
foreign sovereign instrumentalities.200
jurisdictional immunities and, even if those are waived, immunities from
execution.201 Given the ample protections provided by Congress, and the
“comprehensive” nature of the statute, U.S. courts repeatedly have declined
to engraft further protections for defendant sovereigns onto Congress’s
scheme.202 Indeed, the NML majority took exactly this tack.203 To the
extent that the United States has a sovereign interest in refraining from
ordering discovery of sovereign assets, it is firmly up to the political
branches to enact such restrictions.
B. NML and Extraterritorial Discovery
The two strands of thought in U.S case law stem from two contested
theoretical planks in enforcement discovery. The majority position among
U.S. courts rests on two propositions: first, that discovery and execution
are separate, and second, that creditors enjoy a strong presumption in favor
of extraterritorial enforcement discovery. The minority position largely
flows from a tendency to treat merits and enforcement discovery as
essentially similar.
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the NML majority channels the principles of
broad transnational enforcement discovery without directly invoking them
(in part, because the majority accepted the funds’ argument that Argentina
waived any argument regarding the breadth of Rule 69 and relied solely on
the FSIA). The majority stated simply that it would be improper to
interpose any of the FSIA restrictions before the funds even knew what
property was potentially available for seizure.204 This simple statement
implies a strong commitment to disclosure of any assets by the debtor,
anywhere in the world, before the sorting of seizable from immune assets
begins. It also necessarily dictates that this sorting will be done by the court
and not by the debtor when it responds to discovery requests.
These principles enable a rigorous examination of two prominent
obstacles to worldwide enforcement discovery: restrictions on discovery
and restrictions on execution. It also sheds light on one of the mysteries of
the NML opinions. Two of the Court’s most analyzed international law
opinions in recent memory—Morrison v. National Australia Bank205 and
200. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004) (describing the FSIA as
“a comprehensive framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity”).
201. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012).
202. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285, 2291 (2010); Altmann, 541 U.S. at
699; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
203. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2014) (“Thus,
any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand
on the Act’s text. Or it must fall.”).
204. Id. at 2257–58.
205. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum206—hold that “[w]hen a statute gives no
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”207
Yet, neither Morrison nor Kiobel makes any appearance in the NML
opinions. (It was raised at argument, albeit briefly.208) It may be that the
majority simply regarded it as waived, although the Court’s enthusiasm to
reach the issue in Kiobel suggests that sudden restraint on this front is
unlikely. That leaves two possibilities. The first is that perhaps longstanding practice (as in the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws)
still can influence that analysis of whether a statute applies abroad. The
Court echoed, without directly invoking, decades of federal court case law
setting out a strong presumption in favor of extraterritorial enforcement
discovery. Perhaps this strong presumption played a role in the Court’s
decision not to address the issue.
The other possibility highlights the importance of state law in
enforcement discovery. Rule 69(a)(2) states: “In aid of the judgment or
execution, the judgment creditor or a successor in interest whose interest
appears of record may obtain discovery from any person—including the
judgment debtor—as provided in these rules or by the procedure of the state
where the court is located.”209 The rule permits the creditor to seek
discovery under either federal law or the applicable state law. (State law,
per Rule 69(a)(1), provides the applicable execution procedures.) Morrison
and Kiobel are opinions about federal statutory construction. They are not
more than that. States are entitled to, and do, have their own policies
regarding extraterritoriality. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals
recently made plain that the extraterritorial reach of federal and state
antitrust law should not be “viewed as coextensive.”210
Indeed, the subpoenas at issue in NML were issued under New York law.
New York courts, as described above, have long taken a robustly
extraterritorial approach to enforcement discovery. In fact, the New York
legislature specifically enacted C.P.L.R. 5224(a-1) to “establish[] the
extraterritorial reach of a subpoena duces tecum.”211 Morrison and Kiobel
impose no bar. This not only answers one of many mysteries of the NML
opinions, but also makes plain that the strong presumption in favor of
extraterritorial enforcement discovery comes at least as much from the
states as from the federal government.

206. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
207. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
208. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50.
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2).
210. Global Reinsurance Corp. U.S. Branch v. Equitas Ltd., 969 N.E.2d 187, 196 (N.Y.
2012) (“For a Donnelly Act claim to reach a purely extraterritorial conspiracy, there would,
we think, have to be a very close nexus between the conspiracy and injury to competition in
this state.”).
211. CE Int’l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P’ship, No. 12-CV08087(CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013).
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II. RESTRICTIONS ON DISCOVERY
Transnational asset discovery typically runs into two roadblocks:
restrictions on discovery and restrictions on execution. Certainly the
challenges of these two types of restrictions are different, but they both
constitute the expression of a sovereign that certain assets should be
shielded from the judgment enforcement process.
Foreign blocking statutes—laws aimed at preventing disclosure of certain
information in the face of discovery requests coming from other
sovereigns—have seen a great deal of analysis from both courts and
commentators. Indeed, the subject is treated at length in the Third
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States212 and in the
Supreme Court’s Aerospatiale decision.213 These sources, however, are
concerned exclusively with pretrial discovery. Despite the fact that many of
their concerns and conclusions pertain only to pretrial discovery, they have
been extended into the post-judgment realm without sufficient appreciation
for the significant differences between discovery designed to adjudicate a
claim and discovery designed to promote satisfaction of an award or
judgment. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg referred to Aerospatiale for the
proposition that U.S. discovery is typically broader than that permitted by
other nations.214 True, pretrial; post-judgment, perhaps not so.
A. The Aerospatiale Test: A Tool Designed for Pretrial Discovery
Foreign restrictions on discovery may embody many policy values, such
as bank secrecy215 or personal data privacy.216 States also may enact them
“[a]s a classic form of asset protection” designed to “disentitle judgment
creditors from access to financial information that describes the assets, and
identifies the custodian for purposes of enforcement,” with the purpose of
“deliberately hobbl[ing] the judgment creditors’ attempts to discover and

212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 442 (1987).
213. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 552
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The presence of these
interests creates a tension between the broad discretion our courts normally exercise in
managing pretrial discovery and the discretion usually allotted to the Executive in foreign
matters.”).
214. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542).
215. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974 (RJS), 2011 WL
6156936, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011), vacated, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014) (“According
to the Bank, Chinese bank secrecy laws prohibit the disclosure of customer account
information without consent. The Bank argues that, because production of the information
sought by Plaintiffs could subject the Bank to civil and criminal liability, the appropriate
way for Plaintiffs to make a request for documents is through the Hague Convention.”).
216. See Carla L. Reyes, Note, The U.S. Discovery-EU Privacy Directive Conflict:
Constructing a Three-Tiered Compliance Strategy, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 357, 357
(2009) (“The steady increase of trans-border litigation has brought the conflict between U.S.
discovery rules and EU data protection laws into sharp focus and spurred intense debate.”).
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These enactments are commonly termed foreign
reach assets.”217
“blocking” statutes.
Blocking statutes are the most common and most discussed obstacle to
transnational discovery. The Supreme Court took up their effect on pretrial
merits discovery in its 1987 Aerospatiale decision, where the Court held the
U.S. discovery requests demanding documents located abroad did not
necessarily offend foreign “judicial sovereignty.”218 The Court noted:
“The French ‘blocking statute’ does not alter our conclusion. It is well
settled that such statutes do not deprive an American court of the power to
order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the
act of production may violate that statute.”219 Simply put, “American
courts are not required to adhere blindly to the directives of such a
statute.”220
In commenting on the French blocking statute, the Court recognized an
important principle at work in the push-and-pull between discovery and
blocking statutes: “Extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction are not onesided.”221 A U.S. discovery order may “have some impact in France,”
while “the French blocking statute asserts similar authority over acts to take
place in this country.”222 A U.S. court certainly need not defer to such a
foreign statute where it seeks “to provide the nationals of such a country
with a preferred status in our courts” and “[i]t would be particularly
incongruous to recognize such a preference for corporations that are wholly
owned by the enacting nation.”223 The French blocking statute, “if taken
literally, would appear to represent an extraordinary exercise of legislative
jurisdiction by the Republic of France over a United States district judge,
forbidding him or her to order any discovery from a party of French
nationality.”224
Rather than set out a bright-line rule,225 the Court laid out a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors, essentially adopting the test proposed in
the Restatement.226 The Court looked to: (1) the importance of the
information to the proceedings; (2) the specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States; (4) whether the
217. David J. Cook, Financial Regime Change: Enforcement of Judgments Against
Offshore Entities and Foreign States, Their Agencies, and Instrumentalities, 18 NEW ENG. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 41–42 (2012).
218. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 557–58.
219. Id. at 544 n.29 (citing Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204–06 (1958)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. (“The lesson of comity is that neither the discovery order nor the blocking statute
can have the same omnipresent effect that it would have in a world of only one sovereign.”).
223. Id.
224. Id. (noting that this bar would cover “even simple requests for admissions or
interrogatories that the party could respond to on the basis of personal knowledge”).
225. Id. at 543–44 (“[T]he concept of international comity requires in this context a more
particularized analysis of the respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting
nation than petitioners’ proposed general rule would generate.”).
226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 442 (1987).
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information could be obtained in another way; and (5) a balancing of the
national interests of the United States against that of the foreign sovereign
where the information is held.227
The Court raised several concerns for lower courts to bear in mind when
considering
“[t]he
exact
line
between
reasonableness
and
unreasonableness.”228
The Court observed that “[s]ome discovery
procedures are much more ‘intrusive’ than others” and contrasted “an
interrogatory asking petitioners to identify the pilots who flew flight tests”
with “a request to produce all of the ‘design specifications, line drawings
and engineering plans and all engineering change orders and plans and all
drawings.’”229
The Court then urged “American courts, in supervising pretrial
proceedings,” to “exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from
the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place
them in a disadvantageous position.”230 The Court noted that “[j]udicial
supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs and
inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery requests,” and that
“[w]hen it is necessary to seek evidence abroad, however, the district court
must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to prevent
discovery abuses.”231 By way of example, the Court noted that “the
additional cost of transportation of documents or witnesses to or from
foreign locations may increase the danger that discovery may be sought for
the improper purpose of motivating settlement, rather than finding relevant
and probative evidence.”232 Thus, “[o]bjections to ‘abusive’ discovery that
foreign litigants advance should therefore receive the most careful
consideration.”233
Overall, the Court turned to the then-current draft of the Restatement—
itself concerned only with pretrial discovery—to urge lower courts to
exercise caution: “[N]o aspect of the extension of the American legal
system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to
so much friction as the request for documents associated with investigation
and litigation in the United States.”234
B. Using a Pretrial Tool for Post-Judgment Problems
The Court’s repeated emphasis on “pretrial proceedings” is telling. Each
of the concerns noted by the Court either fall away or are greatly
diminished post-judgment. Nevertheless, lower courts have applied the

227. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir.
1992).
228. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
229. Id. at 545 (citing app. 29).
230. Id. at 546.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 549 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED) § 437, reporters’ cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 7, Apr. 10, 1986)).
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Aerospatiale test to post-trial enforcement discovery without significant
modification—albeit typically with some generosity toward the judgment
creditor.
For example, the Ninth Circuit took up “a number of difficult questions
regarding a sensitive area of law and foreign relations” posed by a request
for transnational enforcement discovery.235 An American corporation “won
a default judgment for fraud and breach of contract against . . . a
corporation organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and an arm of the PRC government.”236 The creditor served several
discovery requests on the debtor attempting to gain information in its
“assets worldwide.”237 After some delay, the debtor sought guidance from
the PRC government on how the PRC’s State Secrecy Act applied to the
requests and was informed “that almost all of its financial information was
classified a state secret and could not be disclosed.”238
The Ninth Circuit applied the standard Aerospatiale analysis. In
considering the importance of the documents, the court noted: “[T]he
information sought is not only relevant to the execution of the judgment, it
is crucial. Without information as to [the debtor]’s assets, [the creditor]
cannot hope to enforce the judgment. The execution proceedings, and in
some sense the underlying judgment itself, will be rendered
meaningless.”239 On the other hand, the court noted that the debtor “has no
United States office,” that “[a]ll of its employees, and all of the documents”
requested are located in the PRC, and that “[t]his factor weighs against
requiring disclosure.”240
The debtor did not assert that the information could be obtained from
another source. Nevertheless, the court concluded that, even if the creditor
could obtain information from the debtor’s parent corporation, it would not
contain the “core financial information” to which the creditor was
entitled.241 The court stated: “[The creditor] appears to have done
everything in its power to collect information which will enable it to
enforce the judgment. To date, it has been unsuccessful. The absence of
other sources for the information [the creditor] seeks is a factor which
weighs strongly in favor of compelling disclosure.”242
In considering the balance of national interests, the court noted that the
United States has a “substantial” interest “in vindicating the rights of
American plaintiffs” and a “vital” interest “in enforcing the judgments of its
courts.”243 On the PRC side of the ledger, the PRC had specifically

235.
1992).
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1472.
Id.
Id. at 1475.
Id.
Id. at 1476.
Id.
Id. at 1477 (citing In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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admonished the debtor not to turn over the documents.244 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the PRC had expressed no hesitation about disclosing
the information voluntarily for marketing purposes prior to the litigation
and that “[t]he only likely ‘adverse’ effect on the PRC economy will be that
[the creditor] may be able to collect its judgment, something the PRC has
no legitimate state interest in preventing.”245
The Ninth Circuit went on to consider the hardship to the debtor,
invoking the Supreme Court’s admonition that threat of criminal
prosecution is a “weighty excuse” for nonproduction.246 The court noted
that the debtor “has in fact been ordered by the Chinese government to
withhold the information, and has been told that it will bear the ‘legal
consequences’ of disclosing the information,” and that it “therefore seems
to be placed in a difficult position, between the Scylla of contempt
sanctions and the Charybdis of possible criminal prosecution.”247 But the
court dismissed this concern, stating that the debtor always holds the keys
to its own salvation: “[T]he discovery dispute arose only because [the
debtor] refused to post a supersedeas bond or letter of credit to stay
execution of the judgment pending appeal, as required by [Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] 62(d).”248 The court noted that the debtor “even now
could post a supersedeas bond pending the outcome of its petition for
certiorari, or it could pay the judgment,” and that “[e]ither of these courses
of action would keep it from having to violate either the district court’s
orders or the PRC’s laws.”249
Finally, the court considered whether the “discovery order is likely to be
unenforceable, and therefore to have no practical effect,” noting that, if so,
“that factor counsels against requiring compliance with the order.”250 The
court concluded that “[i]n this case, it may be impossible to force [the
debtor] to comply,” and that “[t]he imposition of sanctions in the amount of
$10,000 a day, sanctions which have already grown larger than the
underlying judgment, has failed to move” them: “Compliance therefore
seems unlikely, a factor counseling against compelling discovery.”251
Nonetheless, the court noted that “the discovery and contempt orders
may be of some significance.”252 The court observed that, although the
debtor “apparently has no assets in the United States, it has in the past done
substantial business in this country” and that “[s]hould it wish to do
business here in the future, it would have to pay the judgment or risk having

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (quoting Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1477–78 (noting because the debtor “could—and still can—avoid the hardship
disclosure would place on it, that hardship is not a factor weighing against disclosure”).
250. Id. at 1478.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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its assets seized and its business interrupted.”253 The court also expressed
some optimism that “a clear statement that foreign corporations which avail
themselves of business opportunities in the United States must abide by
United States laws might have a substantial effect on the way [the debtor]
and other corporations do business in the United States in the future.”254 In
sum, the court concluded that, although “full compliance by [the debtor]
with the order of the district court is unlikely,” the “order may nonetheless
produce partial compliance, and might be effective in other ways as well”
and that, “[w]hile the likelihood of noncompliance does weigh against
compelling disclosure, we think the weight of this factor is lessened by
these mitigating circumstances.”255
In the end, the court held that “the balance tips significantly (although not
overwhelmingly)” in the creditor’s favor and upheld the subpoenas.256
Notably, the court’s language suggested its conception of the judgment as
essentially transnational in nature: “[The creditor] can seek to execute the
judgment in whatever foreign courts have jurisdiction over [the debtor’s]
assets, but [the creditor] needs discovery in order to determine which courts
those are.”257
Some judgment creditors have not been so fortunate. The Seventh
Circuit upheld a district court’s refusal to compel post-judgment
interrogatories “in favor of Romania’s laws protecting national secrecy.”258
An American creditor obtained a default judgment against a Romanian
debtor—both reinsurance companies—and sought to discover assets both
inside and outside Romania.
Judge Bauer, writing for the panel, proceeded to balance the “vital
national interests” at stake. The court allowed that “the courts of the United
States undoubtedly have a vital interest in providing a forum for the final
resolution of disputes and for enforcing these judgments,” but held that
“[t]his rather general interest, however, is not as compelling as,” to name a
few examples, protection of U.S. patents or antitrust policy, or cases where
the United States is a party.259 The court observed that this case was a mere
“private dispute between two reinsurance corporations,” in which “[t]he
253. Id.
254. Id. (“Our recent decision in Insurance Antitrust is instructive. In that case, the court
concluded that an injunction against Lloyd’s of London would not be enforced by the British
courts. It nonetheless upheld the injunction because it could be enforced within the United
States, and because it would send a message to companies who wished to do business in the
United States in the future.” (citing In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 933 (9th Cir.
1991))).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. (“Beijing may be able as a practical matter to conceal its assets from the district
court and therefore avoid execution of [the creditor’s] judgment, but it has no right to do so,
and it certainly has no right to avail itself of the United States judicial system for purposes of
appeal while at the same time seeking to evade the judgments of that judicial system.”); see
also Nippon Emo-Trans Co. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
258. Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275,
1277 (7th Cir. 1990).
259. Id. at 1280.
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disputed materials are the subject of a post-judgment interrogatory request
and not vital to the case-in-chief.”260 In such a case, although “there is
unquestionably a vital national interest in protecting the finality of
judgments and meaningfully enforcing these decisions, this interest alone
does not rise to the level of those found in” other cases.261
Against this, the court weighed “the Romanian interest in protecting its
state and so-called ‘service’ secrets,” noting that, “[g]iven the scope of its
protective laws and the strict penalties it imposes for any violation,
Romania places a high price on this secrecy.”262 The court observed that
“[u]nlike a blocking statute, Romania’s law appears to be directed at
domestic affairs rather than merely protecting Romanian corporations from
foreign discovery requests” and held that, “[g]iven this choice between the
relative interests of Romania in its national secrecy and the American
interest in enforcing its judicial decisions, we have determined that
Romania’s, at least on the facts before us, appears to be the more immediate
and compelling.”263
The court then went on to consider the hardship to the Romanian debtor,
noting that “[t]hose persons forced to comply with this discovery order
would be Romanian citizens subject to the criminal sanctions of the law
protecting state secrets.”264 The court placed great weight on this factor,
notwithstanding the Restatement’s view that criminal penalties alone are
not sufficient to refuse a request for discovery.
Judge Easterbrook wrote separately to express serious frustration with the
court’s decision. Judge Easterbrook observed that the recently defunct
Romanian regime had declared everything “secret.”265 The debtor invoked
“Romania’s secrecy laws, which forbid it to disclose any information in its
hands, even information about assets located outside Romania.”266 The
“effect is that no judgment against Romania may be collected.”267 Judge
Easterbrook observed that the debtor is an arm of the Romanian state, that
the United States would permit execution against its assets under the FSIA,
and that the FSIA should “eclipse[] any attempt by the foreign defendant to
create its preferred list by using its domestic secrecy law.”268 In short, “[i]f
we allow foreign states to exempt themselves after the fashion of (the old)
Romania, we might as well forget about the FSIA.”269
Judge Easterbrook also took issue with the court’s statement that “a suit
by the government is ‘more important’ than private litigation.”270 Rather,
“enforcement of contracts is a subject of the first magnitude,” and, in
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1280–81.
Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1283 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1284.
Id.
Id.
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addition, “[t]he gravity of the nation’s interest is no less when it decides to
enforce vital rules through private initiative.”271 The majority’s analysis
further breaks down when a “judgment has been rendered and the
prevailing party seeks to discover assets,” a “problem[] which the
Restatement does not discuss.”272 Judge Easterbook concluded: “A
prevailing party is entitled to relief; so much has been determined by the
judgment. At this point resort to secrecy laws does nothing but nullify the
rendering nation’s substantive law.”273
These cases demonstrate a principle that should be readily apparent:
pretrial and post-judgment discovery are very different creatures. Neither
the Aerospatiale test, nor the Restatement approach on which it was based,
were designed with the post-judgment enforcement discovery in mind. At a
minimum, transnational asset discovery requires substantial modification to
the approach taken by the Supreme Court and the Restatement.
C. A Post-Judgment Approach for Enforcement Discovery
The uncritical extension of Aerospatiale’s pretrial discovery framework
to post-judgment asset discovery is problematic and unwarranted. In
Aerospatiale, the Court viewed itself as stepping foot into very dangerous
waters—the perceived conflict between broad American pretrial discovery
and more restrictive approaches typically used elsewhere. The Restatement
expressed similar trepidation, observing that no body of American law had
provoked more conflict than American discovery.274
Accordingly, the Court emphasized caution for pretrial discovery:
“American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise
special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a
disadvantageous position” and when evidence is demanded abroad, “the
district court must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to
prevent discovery abuses.”275 The Court then emphasized that, while courts
should always be mindful of cost and expense in the pretrial discovery
process, the costs may be even higher where documents and witnesses must
be transported from abroad and, accordingly, there will be greater scrutiny
of any claims that “abusive” discovery practices are being used to force a
settlement.276 When a foreign state or foreign sovereign instrumentality is
concerned, caution is all the more important.277

271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. (“A court would need to know the ‘importance’ of the substantive rule, which is
not well correlated with the enforcement mechanism. (The antitrust laws are ‘more
important’ than the littering laws, although the former are largely enforced by private suits
and the latter by public prosecutions.)”).
274. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
549 (1987); supra note 234 and accompanying text.
275. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
276. Id. at 546–47.
277. See id. at 547.

3334

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

These concerns articulated by the Aerospatiale Court fall away, or at
least diminish considerably, in the context of post-judgment enforcement
discovery. Accordingly, the test announced by the Court should be
substantially modified. As discussed above, there is a strong presumption
that the judgment creditor is entitled to “free rein”278 to seek “all matter
relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment.”279
Simply put, the private factors announced by the Court in Aerospatiale
have little or no applicability to post-judgment enforcement discovery
against debtors. Against third-party garnishees, they only have relevance
where the third party could not have reasonably anticipated being subject to
competing demands from different sovereigns (at least, if the law of
discovery is to be brought into line with the law of asset seizures, as seems
sensible).
The Supreme Court recognized in its recent decision in Atlantic Marine
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court280 that the private factors normally
present in a court’s decision to grant a transfer or a motion for forum non
conveniens dismissal are irrelevant when the parties have consented to a
forum selection agreement.281 A judgment is a compulsory contract created
by the court between creditor and debtor—similar to an equitable trust, the
court creates the relationship between the parties. The debtor is bound to
deliver a sum certain to the creditor. Failure to do so subjects it to
penalties, such as statutory post-judgment interest. For arbitral awards, this
relationship is even stronger, as the arbitral tribunal necessarily draws its
power from the actual consent of the parties, whereas a court may draw it
from presence, purposeful availment, or targeting of the jurisdiction where
the court sits. When this involuntary contract forms, unlike pretrial
discovery, there seems no reason to attend to the private factors of the
Aerospatiale test for a debtor.
III. RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTION
Foreign discovery restrictions are not the only obstacle to transnational
asset discovery. The question that split the federal courts of appeals and,
later, the Supreme Court, was subtly different. Post-judgment asset
discovery must be “relevant” to satisfying the judgment. If an asset cannot
be seized, sold, and applied to a judgment, it cannot be “relevant” to
satisfaction of a judgment. If a statute provides that a certain class of assets
is exempt from execution, they cannot be “relevant” to satisfaction of a

278. Carrick Realty Corp. v. Flores, 598 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (Civ. Ct. 1993).
279. Tech. Multi Sources, S.A. v. Stack Global Holdings, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 357, 357
(App. Div. 2007) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5223).
280. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
281. See id. at 582 (“[A] court evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to transfer
based on a forum-selection clause should not consider arguments about the parties’ private
interests.”).
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judgment.282 Homestead exemptions are the classic example; indeed,
Justice Scalia raised them at oral argument in the NML case.283
This seems simple enough. Unfortunately, that is where the simplicity
ends. The NML argument and opinions raised this issue in a particular
context—the FSIA’s restrictions on execution on assets owned by a foreign
sovereign or by a foreign sovereign instrumentality. The FSIA provides
several such exemptions, for example, for assets directly owned by a
foreign state that are not used for a commercial purpose.284 The entire
controversy before the Court could be summarized as: Do these
exemptions have any relevance to discovery?
Restrictions on execution, both foreign and domestic, have not before
been analyzed as a conflict of laws problem. The split in the NML opinions
highlights this gap. The majority ignores the problem, essentially adopting
(without referring to) the line of authority holding that discovery is separate
from execution. This is a simple—and perhaps the best—rule, but it cannot
stand ipse dixit, particularly in light of the requirement that discovery be
“relevant” to satisfaction on an award.285 This rule would seem to require
more support than the majority’s somewhat casual assertion that the debtor
needs to find out what property is available before litigating issues of
executability.286 Perhaps, but what then?
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent grapples with the issue, arguing that domestic
exemptions from execution should be extended abroad, at least for
sovereigns, at least presumptively.287 This is a modest rule, but it too
overlooks the unique concerns of post-judgment enforcement discovery.
To take one example: Whose law applies to an asset that can move, rapidly
and at the will of the debtor, from state to state?288 A functioning judgment
enforcement system cannot accept the answer that an asset’s mere and
perhaps temporary presence in a state that would shield it is sufficient to
defeat post-judgment asset discovery.
The Court unanimously rejected Argentina’s chief argument, that the
FSIA, which says nothing explicit about discovery, contains an implicit
restriction on discovery.289 But Justice Ginsburg split from her colleagues
282. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012).
285. See id.
286. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014)
(“Argentina maintains that, if a judgment creditor could not ultimately execute a judgment
against certain property, then it has no business pursuing discovery of information pertaining
to that property. But the reason for these subpoenas is that NML does not yet know what
property Argentina has and where it is, let alone whether it is executable under the relevant
jurisdiction’s law.”).
287. See id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
288. Lynn LoPucki observed that the ability of a debtor to rapidly move intangible assets
across sovereign boundaries would dramatically curtail satisfaction of judgments. See
generally LoPucki, supra note 194.
289. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2256 (majority opinion) (“There is no third provision forbidding
or limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets.
Argentina concedes that no part of the Act ‘expressly address[es] [post-judgment]
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on a subtler distinction. In her dissent, she maintained that U.S. courts
should presumptively look to U.S. law as a guide for which assets are
available for execution—if they are immune, discovery should be barred as
not relevant to satisfaction of the judgment. The majority assumed, without
deciding, that extraterritorial post-judgment discovery is typically
appropriate and that, at any rate, imposing an evidentiary burden on the
creditor before it has any idea what the debtor owns would be premature.
This disagreement highlighted an issue that has thus far been unexplored:
When should exemptions on execution restrict transnational asset
discovery? Or more to the point: Whose exemptions should restrict
discovery? There are at least four possibilities: (1) Never and nobody’s.
This was the approach assumed by the majority. (2) The exemptions of the
court ordering discovery—in NML, the U.S. court—should govern
worldwide. This was Justice Ginsburg’s approach. (3) The exemptions of
the state where the asset currently sits should govern. (4) And lastly, that
exemptions should only restrict transnational discovery where essentially
every jurisdiction would bar seizure of a particular class of assets (perhaps,
for example, consular property).
The NML majority assumed the first rule while Justice Ginsburg adopted
the second—but with neither opinion considering the issues implicated by
the choice.
A. The “Sky May Be the Limit”
In the NML decision, the Supreme Court assumed (and the government
conceded) that, in the ordinary case, “the district court would have been
within its discretion to order the discovery from third-party banks about the
judgment debtor’s assets located outside the United States.”290 In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg decried this as assuming that the “sky may be the
limit.”291 Justice Ginsburg observed that property must be subject to
attachment to be “relevant” to judgment satisfaction and therefore
discoverable and, from that premise, argued that U.S. courts should look to
their own laws for any assumptions about which property is subject to
execution. For example, under the FSIA, sovereign property not used for
commercial purposes or not in the territorial United States would be
excluded.292
Justice Ginsburg’s objection has intuitive appeal. In some quarters, U.S.
courts have a reputation for riding roughshod over foreign law.293 Foreign
states have, on some occasions, complained of rough treatment at the hands
discovery.’ Quite right.” (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 49, at 22) (internal
citations omitted)).
290. Id. at 2255 (quoting EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 208 (2d Cir.
2012), aff’d sub nom. NML, 134 S. Ct. 2250).
291. Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
292. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012).
293. See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva, Sovereignty on Our Terms, 110 YALE L.J. 885, 885 (2001)
(“The court extended a questionable line of precedents that displaced the Hague Convention
in the management of discovery in federal courts.”).
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of U.S. courts (Argentina being a recent, and vocal, example).294 One
could easily count this admittedly bold assumption of authority as another
example of American legal adventurism.
But, in the context of transnational post-judgment enforcement
discovery, the majority’s approach has much to recommend it. First, it fits
well with the realities of post-judgment enforcement discovery practice.
Second, it avoids a potentially troubling extension of U.S. law—in this
instance, U.S. law on property exemptions from execution—to other
nations.
The NML Court did not particularly concern itself with the on-the-ground
realities of post-judgment enforcement discovery. But the majority’s
generous assumption comports well with established practices from lower
courts. Post-judgment discovery requests are necessarily broad—typically
“all assets”—and without qualification. Limitations, such as, say, “all
assets that are not consular in nature,” would place in the debtor’s hands the
ability to make determinations about what assets are or are not consular—in
other words, which assets are available to satisfy a potential judgment. As
discussed above, this is unacceptable in post-judgment discovery, where it
is more likely that the producing party is acting in bad faith and, at the same
time, there are few means to deter bad faith conduct. Although garnishees
are not assumed to be acting in bad faith, they are typically considered to
have less at stake—they are simply holding the debtor’s assets, without any
direct interest in them.
In addition, the due process interests of the parties apply pressure to keep
discovery requests in merits proceedings from becoming pure “fishing
expeditions.” These interests are reduced or extinguished post-judgment.
When a party goes from defendant to debtor, its due process interests are
necessarily diminished in a variety of ways, including its interest in being
free from broad discovery requests.295
B. Domestic Exemptions Abroad
The heart of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent are her statements that “[a] court
in the United States has no warrant to indulge the assumption that, outside
our country, the sky may be the limit for attaching a foreign sovereign’s
property in order to execute a U.S. judgment against the foreign sovereign,”
and therefore, “[w]ithout proof of any kind that other nations broadly
294. In just one example of Argentina’s public relations campaign, it issued an official
communiqué on June 26, 2014, later republished in several newspapers as a full-page
advertisement, stating that the communiqué “serves as a warning to the United States about
the consequences of its acts, in view of the international responsibility that falls on it with
regard to decisions adopted by its judiciary.” Official Communique of the Argentine
Government,
WASH.
POST,
June
29,
2014,
at
B8,
available
at
http://www.embassyofargentina.us/fil/ckFiles/files/officialcommuniqueoftheargentinegovern
ment-argentinapays.pdf (paid advertising); see also Julian Ku, Here Comes That Frivolous
Argentina ICJ Claim! Oh, and They Have No Jurisdiction Either!, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 7,
2014 1:46 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/08/07/comes-frivolous-argentina-icj-claim-ohjurisdiction-either/.
295. See supra Part I.A.3.
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expose a foreign sovereign’s property to arrest, attachment or execution, a
more modest assumption is in order.”296
These statements essentially set forth two principles: first, that the
United States should extend its law of exemptions from execution to other
nations (at least for sovereigns and their instrumentalities), and second, that
judgment creditors should have the initial burden of proving that foreign
law would permit execution against these assets if it would be barred under
U.S. law.
The most natural defense of Justice Ginsburg’s proposed rule is that it is
merely a presumption in favor of the debtor when U.S. law would shield the
debtor’s assets from execution. But this approach overlooks the differences
between merits and enforcement discovery and, in doing so, comes into
conflict with the purposes of the FSIA.
Numerous courts have held that general discovery against foreign
sovereigns necessarily must be limited unless a plaintiff can establish that
the FSIA’s jurisdictional immunity does not apply—otherwise being
subjected to the cost and inconvenience of U.S.-style discovery would
devalue that very immunity.297 This poses “something of a chicken and egg
problem” as the discovery may be necessary to uncover the very facts that
would support a waiver of jurisdictional immunity.298
This problem would be even more acute in post-judgment enforcement
discovery. Under Justice Ginsburg’s proposed rule, a creditor would have
to show, before obtaining any asset discovery, that sovereign assets both
were used for a commercial purpose and located in the United States. This
showing would likely be impossible, particularly for intangible assets that
have no readily ascertainable situs (such as the very assets at issue in NML).
In practice, the availability of assets for execution would be a matter for the
political branches. It was the stated purpose of the FSIA to take litigation
and execution against sovereigns out of the hands of the political
branches.299

296. NML, 134 S. Ct. at 2259.
297. See Tyler B Robinson & Erin Bradrick, Judgment Enforcement in the United States
Against Sovereign States: Some Interesting Procedural Questions, 4 DISP. RESOL. INT’L
151, 155 (2010); see also Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2009);
Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 849–52 (5th Cir. 2000).
298. Robinson & Bradrick, supra note 297, at 155; see also Kelly, 213 F.3d at 849.
299. See Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir.
2011); see also Kristina Duffy, Walters v. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd.,
25 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 153, 157–58 (2012) (“Petitioners did not state the specific accounts or
funds they sought to attach, they did not describe the property with sufficient particularity
for the court to determine if the property fell within one of the exceptions. The court held
that the burden of identifying assets should remain on the judgment debtors, because
petitioners can use discovery to obtain sufficient information about the property.”); J.F.
Hulston, Chinese Assault Rifles, Giant Pandas, and Perpetual Litigation: The “Rights
Without Remedies” Dead-End of the FSIA, 77 MO. L. REV. 511, 513 (2012) (“[T]he practical
application of execution provisions under the FSIA is so extremely restrictive as to make the
enforcement of judgments against foreign sovereigns nearly impossible.”).
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C. Foreign Exemptions at Home
But these objections are simply answered: shift the presumption; place
the burden of showing immunity from execution on the debtor, not the
creditor. This squarely raises the question of whose law should apply to the
execution—or the eventual possibility of execution—against a debtor’s
assets. Many assets can move from place to place. Some assets have no
“place.”300
It is not at all clear that the exemptions from execution of the state where
the asset happens to be located should apply to bar discovery. Postjudgment asset discovery only can be had for those assets that are
“relevant” to satisfaction of the judgment—but this typically includes all
assets that could be applied to the judgment. This obligation is not only
geographically broad, it is also temporally broad—it applies to assets that
are now or could become seizable. This temporal breadth is embodied in
the continuing obligation of debtors and garnishees subject to postjudgment asset discovery. By contrast, pre-judgment asset discovery
captures only those assets that a party has at the moment of service. Postjudgment asset discovery is forever—or at least lasts until the judgment is
satisfied or expires.
This temporal breadth of post-judgment asset discovery would then
suggest that if an asset could in the future become subject to execution, it
should be subject to asset discovery. It is therefore not sufficient simply to
say that the debtor must have the burden of showing that its asset is in a
state that would not execute on the asset because of its law on exemptions
from execution. The debtor would have to show that there was no way that
the asset could become subject to execution by, for example, moving to
another jurisdiction without the same exemption.
Real property would seem like an obvious candidate. But asset discovery
is intended not only to uncover the existence of the asset but also all
information relevant to seizure of the asset. This is particularly true for
information that pertains to who owns or controls the asset, for example,
asset tracing information.301
Valuable real property is seldom directly owned.302 A creditor could
very reasonably demand information related to real property in a state that
exempts it from execution in the hopes of finding that it is owned through
corporate entities that could open it up to de facto seizure by, for example,
seizing membership interests in the corporate entity that holds the property
(or the interests in the corporate entity that owns the corporate entity that
owns the corporate entity that owns the real property). By seizing and
selling those interests, the creditor could effectively sell the real property
and apply its value to the outstanding judgment.
300. See Simowitz, supra note 79.
301. See, e.g., In re Williams, 328 S.W.3d 103, 118, 120 (Tex. App. 2010).
302. See James W. Reynolds, Get Real: Using LLCs to Invest in Property, BUS. L.
TODAY, Mar.–Apr. 1995, at 44 (“Prior to the advent of limited liability companies,
partnerships (both general and limited) and, to a lesser extent, S corporations were the legal
forms traditionally favored for organizing closely held investments in real property.”).
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This is not the only complication that would bedevil this approach. U.S.
legislatures and courts have long been clear that a debtor, subject to the
court’s in personam power, can be compelled to bring assets into the
jurisdiction.303 Once within the territorial borders of the enforcing state, the
asset can be executed upon, in other words, seized by the sheriffs or
marshals, sold, and applied to the judgment. The New York Court of
Appeals recently expanded this principle to encompass garnishees as well.
In its decision in Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda,304 the court made clear that a
garnishee holding the debtor’s assets can be compelled to deliver them into
New York, even if the debtor is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New
York.305
And so the debtor’s burden would increase. The debtor would have to
show that the asset was located in a jurisdiction with an applicable
exemption from execution, that the asset was owned in such a way that did
render it effectively subject to seizure through some upstream ownership
interest, and that the asset could not be delivered into the enforcing court’s
hands, either by the debtor or a garnishee.
At argument, Justice Scalia raised the classic property immunity from
execution: the homestead exemption.306 To take that example: a debtor
could show that she owned her mansion directly, that it was in a state with
an applicable homestead exemption, and that the mansion was not capable
of being moved (presumably the easiest showing of the three). That would
render the mansion not “relevant” to satisfaction of the judgment. Perhaps
this would be cold comfort to the debtor resisting asset discovery—she
would have to reveal quite a bit of information simply to block further
discovery. But some important information, such as valuation, still could
be shielded.
D. An International Exemptions Norm
The extension of domestic exemptions from execution appears
unreasonable; the recognition of foreign exemptions fraught with
complications. This leaves a fourth and final possibility: that the debtor
303. In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 5567 (RPP), 2001 WL 123807, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2001) (out-of-state bank accounts); Miller v. Doniger, 814 N.Y.S.2d 141,
141 (App. Div. 2006) (out-of-state bank account); Starbare II Partners, L.P. v. Sloan, 629
N.Y.S.2d 23, 23 (App. Div. 1995) (out-of-state artworks); see also David Gray Carlson,
Critique of Money Judgment (Part Two: Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 43, 189–90 (2009) (“The rule that emerges from Grupo Mexicano is that
persons over whom a court has jurisdiction can be ordered to fetch property located outside
New York. In In re Gaming Lottery Securities Litigation, the court did not hesitate in
ordering a judgment debtor to collect an amount due from a Scottish bank and bring the
proceeds into New York.”).
304. 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009).
305. Id. at 831.
306. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. See generally George L. Haskins,
Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1950) (“Most jurisdictions in the
United States have legislative provisions, commonly referred to as homestead laws, designed
to protect the family home from the reach of certain classes of creditors and to prevent
alienation by the owner without the consent of his spouse.”).
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could show that no state would permit execution on a particular asset. Or,
perhaps, that even if a handful of states would permit such an execution,
exemption from execution is so widespread as to constitute customary
international law.
In theory, this is an appealing limiting principle. After a creditor
propounded a request for asset discovery, a debtor could reveal the
existence of an asset, a customary international law norm that the asset
would be immune from execution, and enough information to establish that
the asset falls into this category. The debtor could avoid disclosing the
same information protected under the third approach (e.g., valuation), as
well some of the thornier topics of ownership and mobility.
The challenge would be in proving up the supposed customary
international norm of freedom from execution. Proving up any sort of
customary international law in disputes between purely private parties, or
even disputes involving a sovereign, is notoriously tricky.307
This may be one area in which sovereigns have a distinct advantage.
Justice Ginsburg writes that U.S. courts should look to domestic law as a
“guide” because “our law coincides with the international norm.”308 She
cites the “Findings and Declaration of Purpose” of the FSIA, which states
that, “[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction
of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and
their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of
judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial
activities.”309
This may not have been accurate in 1976 and may not be accurate now.
But if the initial presumption lies with the debtor to show that international
law forbids execution on an asset, this congressional finding would appear
sufficient for a sovereign debtor to at least meet that burden in the first
instance.
CONCLUSION
The dueling opinions in NML raised far more questions than they
answered. The Court’s holding was narrow: the FSIA does not constrain
discovery. The language of the majority opinion, however, suggests an
expansive view of transnational enforcement discovery, where creditors are
entitled to know the full extent of the debtor’s assets before any other
collateral issues are litigated. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent suggests a much
more constrained role for transnational enforcement discovery, where
courts will look inward to U.S. assets and U.S. law.
The tealeaves left behind by the NML opinion do make one proposition
quite clear: transnational enforcement discovery has barely been explored
307. See generally Paul L. Hoffman, The “Blank Stare Phenomenon”: Proving
Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 181 (1996).
308. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
309. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).
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by U.S. courts. Lower courts are struggling with an increasing volume of
unpaid awards and judgments in which creditors are more than ever looking
abroad for assets to seize and sell.310 The tools they have been handed were
designed for the very different world of pretrial merits discovery.
Enforcement discovery has its own purposes, presumptions, and problem.
Enforcement discovery is necessarily separate from execution. Courts can
and should step fully into the role of guiding creditors on the worldwide
search for assets. Creditors should enjoy a strong presumption of
enforcement discovery even in the face of obstacles such as restrictions on
discovery or execution. Only then can enforcement discovery effectuate the
purposes of the transnational judgment and award enforcement system.

310. The title of the 2014 conference hosted by the Institute for Transnational Arbitration
was “Modern Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: ‘Show Me the Money.’” See INST. FOR
TRANSNAT’L ARB., 26TH ANNUAL ITA WORKSHOP: MODERN ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL
AWARDS:
“SHOW
ME
THE
MONEY”
(2014),
available
at
http://www.cailaw.org/media/files/ITA/EventBrochures/2014/ita-workshop.pdf (last visited
Apr. 23, 2015).

